

Zübeyir Nişancı

Faith *and* Religiosity in Türkiye



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Foreword

This project was initiated in 2018 by IIT and Mahya with the launch of a series of intellectual and academic conversations on the topic of deism and religiosity in Muslim societies. These deliberations initially took the form of correspondence with organizations and scholars in a number of Muslim countries to learn about their views on this critical topic and to explore and map the situation experienced at local levels and its impact. Based on the responses received, the necessity of an analytical research was realized in order to fully comprehend the issues involved. After intensive discussions with scholars and academics in Türkiye, it was concluded that an empirical research conducted with academic professionalism would be the best initial way to examine the issue. It was then decided to utilize the expertise of two independent and experienced academics to conduct a high-quality study. Their task was firstly to identify the local context and factors and then to develop a model survey that could be used as a guideline for further research in other countries and regions.

We are grateful to the team led by Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı, supervised by Dr. Önder Küçükural and coordinated by Muhammed H. Alboğa for their hard work and effort in the preparation of this comprehensive report. We are also deeply indebted to Hatice Nuriler for her involvement in the initial stages of the Project, which included the successful management of a series of discussions and meetings held with academics and institutions both locally and internationally. She also played a pivotal part in many of the discussions which led to the engagement of both Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı and Dr. Önder Küçükural in the research, continuing in a more consultative role by attending meetings having left to pursue a PhD in Denmark. Her dedication and professionalism throughout the various stages of the project are commendable. Following her departure, Hatice Kübra Baktemur successfully took over the task of continuing the administrative process, showing the same professionalism, determination and enthusiasm. We thank her for her meticulous work and dedication. We would also like to express our gratitude to Muhammed H. Alboğa for communicating with various organizations in a number of Muslim countries to gain insight into the local situation, and actively undertaking key roles during the research's design and fieldwork. As Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı mentions in his Acknowledgements Alboğa fulfilled his responsibilities excellently. We thank Dr. Heba Raouf Ezzat for her participation in the workshops and discussions. We extend our appreciation to our partner Mahya, and co-publishers MEDAR, Ibn Haldun University and Marmara University's Center for Population and Social Policies for their endorsement. Finally, we are most indebted to Dr. Bedi Almoravid, the Executive Director of the Institute for Epistemological Studies Europe, and Cemaleddin Demirok of Mahya who attended the meetings held with various institutions and academics from the very beginning and always offered advice and full support.

We hope that this research will further enlighten the issue under discussion and serve as a model for other Muslim societies to adapt, expand upon, and follow.

Dr. Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali

Acknowledgments

The Turkish Faith and Religiosity Survey (TFRS) was initiated and supported by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and Mahya. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali for his invaluable involvement and support in the project. I would also like to express my appreciation to Dr. Önder Küçükural for his consultancy throughout the project, including the development of the research methodology, the preparation of survey questions, the design of the research site, and the review of the research report. Additionally, I would like to thank Hatice Nuriler for her support in coordinating the project from its inception and for her valuable comments and ideas during the development of the questions and implementation of field activities. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Hatice Kübra Baktemur for her diligent work on the organizational and official aspects of the project, particularly in regard to the logistics of the fieldwork. Special thanks are also due to Yusuf Akbulut for his tireless contribution to the data visualization aspects of the project. A. Betül Aydın, who edited and thoroughly reviewed the original text of the report, deserves recognition as well.

Muhammed H. Alboğa, our project coordinator, made very significant contributions to the research project through his diligent and meticulous work at every stage of the project, including the development of the project concept, the creation of survey questions, the formation of field teams, the training of field teams, and the field implementation in 35 different provinces. He consistently supervised the collected data and sampling quotas during the fieldwork, displaying perseverance in leading the fieldwork. In addition, he demonstrated exceptional project coordination skills by effectively finding solutions to various problems encountered in the field concerning logistics, sampling, and methodology. The successful completion of this project is attributed to Muhammed H. Alboğa's command of scientific methods and his contributions to the research methodology. He also coordinated the preparation of the English version of the report.

I extend my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Nurullah Ardiç for his invaluable assistance in the revision of the draft texts of this report and his insightful contributions to its development. I would also like to express my appreciation to the following individuals for their support: Dr. Mehmet Fatih Aysan, Dr. Nühket Sirman, Dr. Feyza Akinerdem, Dr. Alim Arlı, Dr. Azize Aslıhan Nişancı, Dr. Talip Küçükcan, Dr. Nuri Tınaz, and Dr. Ayşe Yetiş-Bayraktar.

I am grateful to Dr. Özgür Arun for his guidance and assistance in assembling the sample and field team in the Mediterranean Region. Similarly, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Hakan Gülerce and Dr. Fatma Çakmak for their assistance in organizing the field team in the Southeast Region. Additionally, I am deeply grateful to Dr. Murat Nişancı for his help and support in accompanying me during the fieldwork in the harsh winter conditions of Gümüşhane, Giresun, Bayburt, Rize, and Trabzon.

I am also indebted to the 50 interviewers who participated in the fieldwork of this research and supported us with their tireless efforts and diligence. Among them, Zahid Erkılıç, Muhammed Fatih Özbek, Merve Reyhan Ekinci, Hilal Nur Baktemur, Zeynep Beyza Çankaya, Vedat Salihoğlu, Feraye Gökçekız Pınarbaşı, Büşra Nur Topal, Abdullah Eren, İrem Erten, and Bedia Kocagöz deserve special recognition for their contributions.

As the coordinator of the project, my involvement in the fieldwork was extremely informative. Throughout the duration of the project, I served as a surveyor in order to gain firsthand experience and facilitate on-site research. I recruited potential participants from 15 different provinces across eight of the 12 regions in Türkiye, sharing survey participation links with approximately 750 individuals. Of the data we collected, approximately

25% was gathered through the links I distributed. This process afforded me the opportunity to observe the dynamics of the field more closely and engage in conversations with participants. Additionally, it allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the social structure of Türkiye from a unique perspective. I was also fortunate to work alongside devoted colleagues, including coordinators and surveyors, and experience the excitement of the field with them. I extend my sincere gratitude to all members of our team and the participants for their contributions.

Principal Investigator

Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı





1 Scope and Method of Study

Introduction

The present report summarizes the results of the Turkish Faith and Religiosity Survey (TFRS), conducted between December 2021 and May 2022. The data for this report was collected through a random sampling of 1,942 individuals aged 18 and over in 12 regions of Türkiye at the Statistical Region Classification Level 1 (NUTS-1), representing both rural and urban populations in proportion. Using graphs, tables, and maps, the report presents the distribution of various dimensions of religious beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors among the adult population in terms of gender, age group, education level, rural-urban residence, and geographical region.

The TFRS Project aims to achieve two main goals. The first is to examine the statistical distribution of common beliefs and religious practices in Türkiye with a more comprehensive and consistent methodological approach than previous studies. The second goal is to evaluate the efficacy of new methods for collecting reliable data in large-scale sociological and statistical studies in Türkiye.

In the pursuit of the first objective, care was taken to avoid common methodological errors that are prevalent in current research on religiosity. A significant issue that has been identified in this regard pertains to the use of flawed questionnaires in determining the distributions of religious beliefs, practices, and attitudes. Specifically, many current studies employ complex questions that are prone to elicit socially desirable responses, thereby introducing bias into the data. Furthermore, a notable proportion of current research focuses on the political dimensions of religiosity, rather than making a concerted effort to comprehensively understand religious beliefs and practices. This narrow focus detracts from the ability to gain a holistic understanding of common religious beliefs, practices, and attitudes.

To address the limitations of previous surveys, the TFRS survey questions were developed by the research team in consultation with academic experts. This process involved a thorough review of relevant local and international surveys over the course of approximately one year. In order to standardize the structure of the questions and response options, the research team considered the potential for statistical data analysis and the limitations inherent in the use of the questions. The survey contained approximately 200 questions covering various dimensions of religious beliefs, attitudes, and practices. Standardizing the response categories allowed for the examination of various aspects not directly explored in the research through the use of methods such as factor analysis.

It is well-recognized that topics related to social life are particularly prone to eliciting social desirability bias. This is especially true for issues surrounding faith and religiosity, which have the potential to create social segregation and conflict. Therefore, in research on these topics, it is likely that participants will provide

responses that are influenced by a desire to conform to social expectations. In order to mitigate this bias in the present study, efforts were made to avoid statements that could be perceived as challenging the participants' beliefs and attitudes, in order to minimize the likelihood of socially desirable responses.

In order to enhance the participation rate of the research, certain methods were implemented. Specifically, innovative field application techniques were devised to allow for comfortable and pressure-free responses to the survey questions. To facilitate this, a digital questionnaire form was created and administered electronically. Participants who were contacted in person were given the option to complete the questionnaire electronically, either immediately or at a later time, while those who were unable or unwilling to do so were interviewed instead. This approach aimed to strike a balance between the existing practices and the need for participant comfort and convenience.

The present research offers the opportunity to generate novel and original statistical data on the religious beliefs, practices, and attitudes prevalent in Türkiye. By conducting a cross-sectional study on these phenomena, we may gain a deeper understanding of the trends in the prevalence of attitudes and practices related to beliefs and religiosity in Türkiye. Repeating this study in future years will further contribute to a more accurate depiction of these tendencies.

The data collection methods and techniques employed in the field of sociology in Türkiye have typically employed stratified sampling techniques that are unnecessarily extensive and costly. For instance, the Religious Life in Türkiye Survey conducted in 2013 utilized a sample of over 25,000 individuals, but the resulting data was not statistically significant due to methodological errors. Similarly, the Turkish Family Structure Survey collects data from approximately 40,000 individuals and 15,000 families every five years, but these general screening and profile studies could be conducted with fewer participants and a focus on the quality and reliability of the collected data, as demonstrated by the TFRS study. New technologies and methods that encourage participation, such as electronic applications, can be utilized to collect high-quality data. Additionally, utilizing region and socio-economic status indicators, as well as a catchment area-based sampling method, as seen in TFRS, can facilitate researchers in collecting reliable data without sacrificing quality.

Despite the preference for household-based sampling methods by public institutions in Türkiye, obtaining voluntary consent for research within these households can be difficult due to the enforcement of legal regulations. This practice contravenes the principle of voluntary participation, a fundamental aspect of survey research, and raises concerns about the reliability of the collected data. However, both TFRS data and the researchers' field experience demonstrate that highly representative data can be collected through voluntary methods, as outlined below.

As part of the TFRS study, in addition to collecting data from field participants, an online perception survey was also conducted to assess the prevalence of common beliefs and practices related to religiosity throughout Türkiye. For instance, this perception survey included a question asking participants to estimate the percentage of individuals over the age of 18 who pray regularly in Türkiye. The results of this perception survey are presented in the report, along with a comparison to the data collected in the field.

What did we do differently?

Ensuring participant confidence and increasing survey participation rates

In countries such as Türkiye, where social desirability bias is prevalent, conducting a survey can pose significant challenges. To ensure the reliability of the data collected, it is important to foster trust with potential participants and encourage them to complete the survey questions without any pressure, including social desirability bias. However, in many large-scale social studies conducted by public institutions, individuals are often required to participate in the research as a compulsory civic duty rather than on a voluntary basis. This can significantly compromise the reliability of the data obtained from such studies. It is, therefore, essential to ensure that participants are given the opportunity to participate in the survey voluntarily and without any pressure.

In numerous studies, individuals are asked to complete survey questions in person. However, in Türkiye, where there is a significant cultural bias towards social desirability, it may be challenging for participants to feel comfortable disclosing sensitive information, such as their religious beliefs and practices. To increase survey participation rates within the scope of TFRS, an electronic link containing the survey invitation was randomly sent to in-person participants as a means of overcoming this potential obstacle.

The participants were able to complete the survey independently and at their own convenience, with the option to receive the survey link via smartphone or as a hard copy with a QR code. In order to accommodate those who preferred not to receive the link via smartphone, the survey links were also printed on cards that included the researcher's contact information. This ensured that all participants had the opportunity to complete the survey without feeling pressured and at a time that was convenient for them.

Participants who were unable or unwilling to participate in the electronic survey were offered the opportunity to complete the survey through face-to-face interviews. To facilitate this, distinct links were generated for these in-person interviews, allowing for the identification and potential comparison of responses from both electronic and in-person surveys within the dataset.

The fieldwork for the TFRS survey was conducted with the voluntary participation principle and with a design that allowed for participants to complete the survey at their own convenience. In order to incentivize participation and show appreciation for their contribution, each participant who agreed to participate was offered a 50 TL shopping card valid at various supermarket chains in Türkiye, including BIM, ŞOK, A101, MİGROS, and CARREFOUR. In addition, a business card with the researcher's official contact information was also provided to all participants who accepted or were invited to participate in the survey.

In the field research utilizing this method, 2,453 survey links were distributed, resulting in a completion rate of 79.17% with 1,942 completed surveys. It is evident that this method resulted in an increase in field costs due to the approximately 20% of links that were not completed. However, the use of gift cards as an incentive for participation in the survey proved to be effective in increasing the acceptance rate of invitations and easing the workload of field interviewers. Additionally, the self-administration of the survey forms reduced the amount of time spent on face-to-face interviews and allowed for the distribution of more survey invitations, ultimately leading to a significant reduction in the cost per survey for the field interviewers.

Extending the question content

One of the primary goals of TFRS is to gather comprehensive information that is related to faith and religiosity, both directly and indirectly. In order to achieve this, the survey included a large number of questions covering a range of topics related to individuals' religious beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and practices, as well as their socio-economic and socio-demographic profiles. Additionally, supplementary questions were asked in order to assess the level of religiosity among the respondents' families, with a particular focus on their parents.

Improving Quality and Standardization of Survey Questions

In Türkiye, numerous large-scale surveys have been conducted in order to assess religiosity. However, a common issue with these surveys is the reliance on doctrine-based questions that may elicit responses influenced by social desirability bias. For instance, certain key beliefs, such as belief in God, the afterlife, and prophets, which are considered essential within the Sunni Islamic tradition, are often directly incorporated into survey questions, such as "Do you believe in God?" and "Do you believe in the prophets?". Past research, such as the Religious Life in Türkiye 2013 survey conducted by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, has shown that responses to these types of questions tend to be uniform and lacking in variability.

The data collected through these questions are not suitable for data analysis due to technical limitations. Previous research on religiosity has largely focused on categorizing and measuring it within the context of political definitions and preferences. For instance, Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak's study on "Religion, Society and Politics in Türkiye," conducted in 1999 and 2006, primarily aimed to examine the public manifestation of religion and its relationship to political preferences and orientations.

While political studies may provide some insight into religious beliefs and practices, they are not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of these phenomena. In order to more fully explore the diversity of religious expression in individuals' lives, the scope of the TFRS questions was expanded to include areas beyond the realm of politics. In order to prevent any potential biases based on social or political acceptability among respondents, the survey minimized the inclusion of questions related to political preferences. This decision has been supported by our field experience, as potential survey participants have frequently inquired about the political content of the survey or whether it was conducted on behalf of a political organization. By avoiding questions about political preferences and voting behavior, we were able to encourage greater participation in the survey and enhance its representativeness.

The TFRS survey does not explicitly ask about the political orientations of its respondents. However, it does provide insight into their political identities through its inclusion of questions about their proximity to various social and political identities, as well as their attitudes towards religion within social institutions such as the state and the constitution. Therefore, it is possible to deduce the political identities of the survey participants.

It is a common practice in surveys conducted in Türkiye to ask participants to self-identify with typologies defined by the researchers. However, it is questionable whether these typologies accurately reflect real-life counterparts. Additionally, the use of predetermined typologies without collecting data restricts the ability to

fully analyze the results of the survey. An example of this can be seen in the KONDA surveys, which ask individuals to classify themselves as "conservative", "traditional", or "modern" based on their lifestyles.¹

The TFRS survey, in contrast to other methods, utilizes a standardized and systematic approach to quantitatively measure various dimensions of belief and religiosity through the use of specific questions posed to respondents. This method does not rely on predetermined typologies, but rather allows for the identification of such typologies through the use of clustering techniques applied to the collected data.

Most of the studies in the field of religiosity utilized technically flawed questions in their research. This issue frequently arises when researchers attempt to assess multiple dimensions of religiosity using a single question. As an example, KONDA's surveys on religiosity ask participants to select from the following options to describe their own religiosity: "a person with no religious belief," "a person who does not believe in religious obligations," "a person who has faith but does not practice religious obligations," "a person who tries to practice religious obligations," and "a person who fully practices all religious obligations."

This question is multifaceted, encompassing three distinct dimensions. The first is the presence or absence of religious beliefs, the second is the belief in the obligations imposed by one's religion, and the third is the actual practice of these obligations. Thus, it can be challenging to differentiate between individuals who hold religious beliefs but do not adhere to their religious obligations and those who do. To address this issue, it is necessary to include separate questions in research instruments that address each of these dimensions individually. This includes a question on belief, a separate question on the perception of religious obligations, which should be clearly defined and measured, and a separate question on actual religious practices. In order to avoid overlap and confusion, the TFRS adopted this approach, using straightforward questions to elicit information about each aspect of religious belief and practice.

Extended education level measurement

In sociological research, the education level of individuals is typically determined based on their highest degree earned. However, this method can be problematic when analyzing data in a country like Türkiye, which has a large youth population and a high number of university students. Using this method, university students are often grouped together with individuals who have only completed high school, making it difficult to accurately examine the relationship between education level and religiosity. In order to address this issue, this study asked participants whether they were currently enrolled in any level of education, and if so, which level. Additionally, all participants were asked to indicate their highest level of education. With this information, an education level variable was created that accurately differentiated university students and graduates from other education levels. As demonstrated in the report, the variable of education level, which was specifically constructed for this study, allowed for an examination of the variance in religiosity among university students.


Geolocations of the conducted surveys

To accurately identify the locations in Türkiye where the survey data were gathered, the research team utilized social media tools to create a survey location group. This group served as a means for interviewers and field coordinators to report the geolocations of each location where survey invitations were shared or face-to-face interviews were conducted. Additionally, the number of survey links shared or interviews conducted at each

¹ KONDA İnteraktif. (n.d.) *Sözlük*. Access Address: <https://interaktif.konda.com.tr/sozluk> (Access date: 28 September 2022)

location were also reported through this group. This method ensured that the exact geographical coordinates of all locations, whether urban or rural, were recorded and readily available for potential future repetition of the survey or similar studies. The collected geolocations are depicted in Map 1.

Map 1. Geolocations of the Field Study



The field research was completed in 35 provinces: Istanbul, Tekirdağ, Edirne, Balıkesir, İzmir, Aydın, Manisa, Kütahya, Bursa, Bilecik, Kocaeli, Ankara, Konya, Antalya, Mersin, Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Niğde, Zonguldak, Çankırı, Samsun, Trabzon, Giresun, Rize, Gümüşhane, Erzurum, Bayburt, Kars, Malatya, Tunceli, Van, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Mardin.

Instant Data Check

The survey data collected on an online platform were thoroughly scrutinized throughout the fieldwork period. Any responses that were deemed to have been completed hastily or randomly were excluded from the dataset. Any errors or issues related to the data collection or sampling method were promptly addressed by pausing the fieldwork and conducting an assessment. Surveys conducted by two interviewers who worked in the project were also excluded from the dataset as we discovered that they did not follow the fieldwork guidelines. To ensure the accuracy of the information collected, new links were generated for every 300 completed surveys to allow for comparisons. This helped to create smaller datasets that facilitated the identification of any errors that may have occurred during the fieldwork.

Sampling

In this study, the sample population consisted of all individuals in Türkiye aged 18 and above. In order to ensure a representative sample of the broader population in terms of socio-demographic and socio-economic factors, a mixed sampling approach was implemented, combining stratified and systematic sampling techniques. This ensured a proportional representation of the target population in the sample.

The sampling method employed used four strata: NUTS-1 regions, socio-economic status (SES) levels, age, and gender. The first stratum consists of the 12 statistical regions in Türkiye at the NUTS-1 level, which are known to exhibit socio-cultural and socio-demographic variance. In order to represent the socio-economic strata of these 12 regions proportionately, neighborhoods and residential units from three SES levels were selected for the survey using the Türkiye-wide distribution rates of SES strata identified in the 2016 study "Türkiye SES Index as a Basis for Stratification Analyses" by Lütü Sunar and Yunus Kaya².

According to the findings of the study conducted by Sunar and Kaya (2016), the distribution rate of the highest socio-economic status (SES) level ("Upper") in Türkiye is 22.2%, while the rate of the second highest stratum ("Upper-Middle") is 14.6%. The rate of the "Lower-Middle" stratum is 38.8% and the rate of the lowest stratum ("Lower") is 44.4%. It is difficult to identify the spatial distribution of the "Upper" layer of the quadrilateral classification throughout Türkiye, particularly in non-metropolitan areas. Therefore, this study aimed to assess the "Upper" and "Upper-Middle" layers in similar locations, treating them as a single layer. In order to identify three neighborhoods with high, medium, and low-price levels, the average market values of houses in settlements with a population of over 100,000 were examined using property indices from the popular property sales platform website, sahibinden.com³. The catchment areas in these neighborhoods were then determined through consultation with local staff in the field, and the "Kent95"⁴ study of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) for Istanbul was also consulted.

The socio-economic status (SES) distribution of the population aged 18 and over in Türkiye is based on the rates provided in the "If Türkiye Had 100 People" report published by KONDA research company in 2022⁵. In this survey, rural areas are classified as belonging to the "Lower" class. According to KONDA's data, 7% of individuals over the age of 18 reside in rural areas as of 2021. In line with these findings, approximately 7% of the TFRS surveys conducted at the NUTS-1 level in 11 out of 12 regions in Türkiye were conducted in rural areas.

The present study did not focus on the examination of rural areas in Istanbul due to the fact that it primarily consists of urban areas on a large scale. Instead, the field study was conducted in 11 of the 12 NUTS-1 regions, with approximately 7% of the "Lower" stratum of the socio-economic status (SES) levels being classified as rural areas. To gather data, interviewers visited villages located outside of city centers in each of the 11 regions and invited individuals they encountered in village squares to participate in the survey using a specified method.

It was determined that it would be difficult to identify neighborhoods with distinct socio-economic status (SES) in settlements with populations under 100,000 due to the lack of significant spatial differences in terms of SES and income level. As a result, half of the surveys planned for these settlements were conducted in central areas and the other half in peripheral areas. In order to identify SES neighborhoods and potential survey

² For more information, see https://tyap.net/media/f/TUSES_Hakkında.pdf. (Accessed date: 28 September 2022).

³ Sahibinden. (n.d.). *Emlak Endeksi*. Access: <https://www.sahibinden.com/emlak360/emlak-endeksi> (Access date: 28 September 2022).

⁴ Kent95. (n.d.). *Veriye Dayalı Politika Aracı*. Access: <https://harita.kent95.org/> (Access date: 28 September 2022).

⁵ KONDA İnteraktif. (n.d.) *Türkiye 100 Kişi Olsaydı*. Access: <https://interaktif.konda.com.tr/turkiye-100-kisi-olsaydi> (Access date: 28 September 2022).

locations in the regions under investigation, scholars with knowledge of the region were consulted for assistance.

Potential participants were invited to participate in the survey through a systematic sampling method in the catchment areas that were identified as having different socio-economic statuses (SES). These catchment areas, which include public spaces that are frequently visited by individuals from all walks of life, were selected for their accessibility to all individuals. The fieldwork for the survey included surveying catchment areas such as shopping malls, marketplaces, main streets, public transportation centers (such as bus stops, terminals, airports, and train stations), parks, regional hospital entrances, and squares.

The study participants were selected by a systematic sampling method in which the interviewers counted the number of potential participants approaching the designated catchment areas and invited the fifth person they encountered to participate in the survey. If the first invitation was declined, the interviewers began the counting process again and offered the fifth person the opportunity to participate. In places such as parks and squares where individuals tend to remain stationary, the interviewers began their counting process from the right and offered the survey to the first fifth person encountered. If this individual declined, they moved on to the next fifth person. If there were fewer than five individuals present in the catchment area, the interviewers began counting from the first person and offered the survey to whoever was the fifth person when counting back to the beginning. For instance, if there were only four people present in a park, the first person was offered the opportunity to participate in the survey. If there were three people present, the second person was invited to participate, and so on.

As previously mentioned, participants in the designated catchment areas were invited to participate in a survey and informed that they would receive a 50 TL shopping card for use at BIM, ŞOK, MİGROS, A101, or CARREFOUR branches as an incentive. Upon agreeing to participate, the volunteers were given a QR code, without being required to provide their phone numbers, to complete the survey at their convenience within a two-day period. Those without a QR code application on their phones were informed that a link could be sent via SMS for them to complete the survey without disclosing their personal information. Alternatively, the survey link was provided to participants through the phones of the interviewers for those who preferred this method.

In order to accurately track the surveyed neighborhoods and catchment areas, the interviewers utilized a method of simultaneously transmitting geolocation data, including approximate geographical coordinates, for each individual who consented to participate in the study. This process, previously described in detail, allowed for the collection of information on the location and time at which the survey invitations were extended. By utilizing this method, the research team was able to maintain a comprehensive record of the data collected.

During the fieldwork, 50 interviewers were hired and deployed in 35 cities across 12 regions. Prior to beginning their work, the interviewers were divided into teams based on the regions they were assigned to and received training on the scope and purpose of the research, as well as detailed instructions on the sampling strategy and method to be utilized. The catchment areas were also selected, and the interviewers received guidelines on appropriate behavior in the field and methods of communication with participants. In order to prepare them for potential challenges they may encounter, the interviewers were also provided with a summary of possible scenarios and emergency protocols. Additionally, at least one member of the project team was present in the field with the interviewers to ensure adherence to established procedures.

The target number of completed surveys was initially set at 2,000. However, following the pilot study, it was determined that approximately 20% of participants who accepted to participate and received a gift card did not fully complete the survey. As a result, it was necessary to send a survey link to 2,400 participants in order to reach the target number within the scope of the research. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of survey participation invitations, including face-to-face surveys, by region and province.

Table 1: Sample distribution according to NUTS-1 and NUTS-3 regions

Code	NUTS-1 (Region)	Sample Share (%)	Links distributed (Regions)*	NUTS-3 (Province)	Links distributed
TR-1	İstanbul	16,9	415	İstanbul	415
TR-2	West Marmara	5,3	130	Tekirdağ	80
				Edirne	20
				Balıkesir	30
TR-3	Aegean	11,6	284	İzmir	211
				Aydın	18
				Manisa	32
				Kütahya	23
TR-4	East Marmara	6,7	164	Bursa	74
				Bilecik	39
				Kocaeli	51
TR-5	West Anatolia	11,3	278	Ankara	198
				Konya	80
TR-6	Meditarranean	13,5	332	Antalya	224
				Mersin	20
				Hatay	63
				Kahramanmaraş	25
TR-7	Central Anatolia	5,5	135	Kayseri	120
				Niğde	15
TR-8	West Black Sea	7,1	175	Zonguldak	80
				Çankırı	35
				Samsun	60
TR-9	East Balck Sea	3,9	95	Trabzon	46
				Giresun	15
				Rize	22
				Gümüşhane	12
TRA	Northeast Anatolia	2,1	52	Erzurum	22
				Bayburt	20
				Kars	10
TRB	Central East Anatolia	5,8	143	Malatya	36
				Tunceli	30
				Van	77
TRC	South East Anatolia	10,2	250	Gaziantep	41
				Şanlıurfa	191
				Mardin	18
Total		100,0	2453		2453

*The numbers in this column include face-to-face surveys

To prevent sampling bias in the field application, a revised sampling strategy was implemented in order to ensure the representation of income level, age, and gender-based social groups matched the distribution rates in Türkiye. This strategy involved the use of region-based quotas for age and gender representation in the 12 regions where fieldwork was conducted, using data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). The field survey was periodically paused at the end of each 300 completed surveys to assess whether the socio-demographic and socio-economic distribution of the sample was significantly different from the general distribution in Türkiye, allowing for the control of sample distribution. While age and gender quotas were generally randomly assigned without intervention, additional efforts were made to meet quotas for individuals over 60 years of age. Approximately 5% of the collected data was obtained after the quota application had been implemented.

The research dataset, which was conducted from December 2021 to May 2022, ultimately yielded a total of 1,942 completed surveys from participants. Demographic information on the distribution of participants by gender, age, education level, income level, and type of settlement (rural or urban) can be found in Appendix 2 of this report.

Online Perception Survey

In order to examine the prevalence of religious beliefs and practices in Türkiye, a field study and online survey were conducted as part of the TFRS project. The field study involved collecting data on the prevalence of these beliefs and practices through on-site research, while the online survey asked participants to estimate the prevalence of these beliefs and practices across the country. The survey was conducted in April 2022 and reached a total of 940 participants, who were recruited through the social media accounts of researchers and academics with a large number of followers. It is important to note that the survey was not based on a random sample and therefore cannot be considered representative of the general population in Türkiye. Additionally, the fact that the survey was disseminated through the social media accounts of academics may have resulted in a higher representation of educated individuals among the participants. Despite these limitations, the data from the online survey is thought to provide insight into the perception of the prevalence of religious beliefs and practices among educated groups in Türkiye. Both the field study and online survey are presented in this report for comparison.

How to read the charts

In this study, the results from the TFRS field study are presented through a series of visualizations. The following section provides guidance on how to interpret and analyze the charts included in this report, using Examples 1, 2, and 3 as references. The meanings of the reference columns, indicators, and data labels will be clarified in order to facilitate understanding of the presented data.

Example 1: Figures with only two response categories

The study participants were asked to respond to a question about whether individuals within their immediate social circles had removed their headscarves within the past two years, with responses being either "yes" or "no." The distribution of these responses is depicted both numerically and visually in Sample Graph 1.

Sample Figure 1: The ratio distribution of those who know someone from their immediate social circle who removed their headscarf




The method of constructing and reading Sample Figure 1 is demonstrated in Sample Figure 1.1 and Sample Figure 1.2.

Sample Figure 1.1: The ratio distribution of those who know someone from their immediate social circle who removed their headscarf



According to Sample Figure 1.1, approximately 42% of respondents answered "yes" to the question, as indicated by the section labeled with the number 1. In contrast, approximately 58% of respondents answered "no," as indicated by the section labeled with the number 2.

Sample Figure 1.2: The ratio distribution of those who know someone from their immediate social circle who removed their headscarf




The distribution of responses is depicted in the graphs through numerical data on the left and right sides and through the size of the colored sections representing the answer categories. For example, in Sample Figure 1.2, the colored area representing the answer "no" is larger than the colored section representing the answer "yes," thereby indicating a difference in the distribution of responses.

Example 2: Reading graphs with multiple answer categories collected in two groups


The TFRS survey includes a large number of questions with multiple response categories. The distribution of responses to these questions is presented in two or three groups. As an example, the survey asks participants to report the frequency with which they seek interpretation of their dreams, providing four answer options: "never", "rarely", "occasionally", and "frequently". The distribution of these responses is presented both numerically and visually in Sample Figure 2.

Sample Figure 2: Frequency of Dream Interpretation




The method of analyzing responses collected in Sample Figure 2 is detailed in Sample Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. These graphs provide insight into the methods used to group and analyze the responses.

Sample Figure 2.1: Frequency of Dream Interpretation



As illustrated in Sample Figure 2.1, the responses of the participants to the question of how often they had their dreams interpreted were divided into two groups. The first group consists solely of the percentage of individuals who answered "never", while the second group includes the combined percentage of those who responded "rarely", "occasionally", or "frequently". This categorization was implemented in order to compare the ratio of individuals who had their dreams interpreted at any frequency with those who had never had their dreams interpreted. The data in the figure indicates that 41% of the participants answered "never" to the question, while the remaining 59% had their dreams interpreted at varying intervals, including "rarely", "occasionally", or "frequently".


Sample Figure 2.2: Frequency of Interpreting Dreams



As demonstrated in Sample Figure 2.2, the relative sizes of the colored sections representing each response category allow for an estimation of the ratio of responses. For instance, among individuals who have had their dreams interpreted, the ratio of those who responded "frequently" is less than half of those who responded

"occasionally." Similarly, the ratio of those who have had their dreams interpreted "occasionally" is slightly lower than the ratio of those who have had their dreams interpreted "rarely."

Sample Figure 2.3: Frequency of Interpreting Dreams




The data presented in Sample Figure 2.3 illustrates the frequency with which participants interpret or have interpreted their dreams. As depicted, 27% of the participants reported rarely interpreting their dreams, while 22% reported occasionally doing so. Additionally, 10% of the participants stated that they frequently engage in dream interpretation. While the report does not provide a more detailed breakdown of the distribution of responses, it instead opts to present the answers in grouped visualizations, either in binary or triadic groupings, in order to facilitate ease of reading and analysis by reducing the number of numbers present in each image.

Example 3: Reading graphs with multiple answer categories collected in three groups


In this report, many graphs illustrate the distribution of responses to various statements by grouping the ratio of answers into three categories. As an example, Sample Figure 3 presents the distribution of survey responses to the statement "Evolution is a scientific fact." The options for responding to this statement include "strongly disagree," "disagree," "neither agree nor disagree," "agree," and "strongly agree." However, as demonstrated in Sample Figure 3, the responses to these types of questions with five answer options are typically numerically grouped into three categories.

Sample Figure 3. Perception of Biological Evolution



The construction and analysis of Sample Figure 3 is demonstrated through the use of three subfigures, namely Sample Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. These subfigures provide information on how the responses were grouped and how they can be interpreted.

Sample Figure 3.1. Perception of Biological Evolution



In Sample Figure 3.1, the ratios of three grouped categories are depicted in the regions labeled 1, 2, and 3. These ratios are presented numerically.


Sample Figure 3.2. Perception of Biological Evolution



Sample Figure 3.2 demonstrates the responses of the group to the statement "Evolution is a scientific fact." As depicted in the figure, the percentage represented by the value labeled 1 on the left (29%) represents the proportion of the group that either "strongly disagree" or "disagree" with the statement. Conversely, the percentage marked with 3 on the right (48%) represents the portion of the group that either "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement.

The central value in the graph, represented by the number 2, indicates the percentage of participants who responded with "neither agree nor disagree" to the statement being presented. This value accounts for 23% of the group. The leftmost value on the graph, representing 29%, includes all answer categories to the left of the central value, while the rightmost value of 48% encompasses all answer categories to the right of the central value. It is important to note that the sum of these three values should equal 100%, though rounding may result in totals of either 99% or 101%.

Sample Figure 3.3. Perception of Biological Evolution



The relative frequency of each response category can be determined by examining the size of the sections representing the respective colors in Sample Figure 3.3. For instance, the proportion of respondents who "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement is 48%, as indicated by the size of the section corresponding to the "agree" category on the right-hand side of the figure. In comparison, the proportion of respondents who "strongly agree" with the statement is significantly lower, at 14%. Additionally, the distribution of all response categories reveals that the ratio of those who "agree" with the statement is nearly double that of those who "strongly agree," with 34% and 14% respectively.






2 Research Findings

Belief in God

The Turkish Faith and Religiosity Survey sought to gather data on the views of participants regarding belief in God. One question specifically asked participants to select from a list of response categories that best reflected their own beliefs, including options such as "I don't believe in God," "I don't know whether there is a God, and I don't believe there is any way to find out," "I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of some kind," "While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God," and "I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it." The distribution of responses to this question is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Belief in God



In Figure 1, the statement "I do not believe in God" represents atheism, a belief system characterized by the absence of belief in the existence of a deity. On the other hand, the statement "I do not know whether there

is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out" indicates agnosticism, a position that maintains that it is impossible to know whether or not a deity exists. Finally, the expression "I do not believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of some kind" reflects deism, a belief system that posits the existence of a higher power without attributing personal characteristics to it. These three categories of belief, or lack thereof, in the existence of a deity can be broadly classified as "unbelievers."

According to the results of the TFRS study, 5.7% of the Turkish population identifies as non-believers. Additionally, the group that expresses belief in God with suspicion ("While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God") and the group that affirms belief in God without doubt ("I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it") can be classified as believers, comprising 94.3% of the total sample. These findings suggest that the majority of the Turkish population holds a belief in God, with 85.7% of believers expressing unwavering conviction. Figures 2 through 6 illustrate the distribution of participants' views on belief in God by various demographic factors, including gender, age group, education level, residential region, and geographical location.

Figure 2. Belief in God According to Gender




Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of participants' beliefs in God by gender. The results indicate that a majority of both male and female participants, approximately 94% in each group, reported either a belief in God without doubt or a belief with some doubt. This suggests that belief in God is prevalent among both male and female participants in the study.

Figure 3. Belief in God by Age Groups




Figure 3 presents the distribution of participants' views on belief in God by age group, revealing that as age increases, belief in God also increases. The age group with the highest rate of belief in God is those 65 and over, with almost all participants (98%) stating that they believe in God with or without a doubt, while only 2% indicated that they do not believe in God. On the other hand, the age group with the highest rate of non-believers is 18-24 year olds, with 11% stating that they do not believe in God and 89% indicating that they believe in God with or without any doubt. These results suggest that age may be a factor influencing belief in God.

Figure 4. Belief in God by Education




Figure 4 presents the distribution of participants' views on belief in God based on their education level. The data reveals that non-belief in God is more prevalent among those with a master's or doctoral degree, with 18% of these individuals reporting non-belief and 82% indicating belief with or without doubt. Similarly, 13% of university students reported non-belief in God, while 87% indicated belief with or without doubt. In contrast, the figure illustrates that over 90% of participants in all other educational groups indicated belief in God with or without doubt. These findings suggest that belief in God decreases with increasing education levels.

Figure 5. Belief in God by Rural and Urban Areas




Figure 5 demonstrates the variations in belief in God among the participants based on their residential areas. The data indicates that the participants residing in rural areas exhibit a slightly higher belief in God compared to those in urban areas. Specifically, 96% of participants in rural areas and 94% in urban areas stated that they believe in God with or without doubt. It is also noteworthy that very few participants in rural regions indicated that they do not believe in God.

Figure 6. Belief in God by Geographic Regions





Figure 6 presents data on the distribution of respondents' beliefs in God according to geographical region (NUTS-1) in Türkiye. The Eastern Black Sea and Northeastern Anatolia regions exhibit the highest levels of faith in God, with 100% of respondents in these regions indicating that they believe in God. Similarly, high levels of belief in God are also observed in the Southeast Anatolia, Central Anatolia, and Western Black Sea regions, with 98%, 97%, and 98% of respondents, respectively, stating their belief in God. In contrast, the Aegean Region exhibits the highest proportion of non-believers, with 11% of respondents in this region reporting that they do not believe in God. This is followed by the Istanbul and West Marmara regions, with 10% and 9% of respondents, respectively, indicating their lack of belief in God.

Non-belief is not as high as predicted

In the online perception survey designed to compare TFRS findings with estimates of the prevalence of belief and religious practices in Türkiye, participants were asked to report on the proportion of respondents in Türkiye who identified as belonging to one of the following categories: "I have no belief in God", "I don't know

whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out", and "I don't believe in a personal God, but do believe in a Higher Power of some kind".

Chart 1. Belief in God Perception Estimation




According to the results presented in Chart 1, most participants in this study estimated the prevalence rate of non-believers in Türkiye to fall within the range of 10-20%. The overall average estimate was 25.5%. However, these estimates are significantly higher than the rate of non-belief in Türkiye, as reported by the TFRS findings, which is 5.7% (as depicted in Figure 1).

Madhhab (Sects)

Within the scope of TFRS, the participants were asked to identify the *madhhab* they affiliate themselves with. Accordingly, Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the *madhhab* to which the participants indicated they belonged.

Figure 7. Distribution of *Madhhabs*



According to the findings of TFRS, approximately 24.7% of the population in Türkiye either do not identify with any madhhab or did not wish to disclose their madhhab affiliation. The Hanafi madhhab is the most prevalent among the Turkish population, with 62% of respondents stating that they belong to this madhhab. The Shafii madhhab is the second most common, with 9% of respondents identifying as members. Alevism is reported by 3.1% of respondents, while those identifying as Hanbali, Maliki, Jafari, or any other madhhab constitute 1.2% of the population.

Religiosity

The majority in Türkiye define themselves as religious.

The TFRS study sought to investigate the significance of religion in the lives of individuals by asking participants to self-report their level of religiosity. Respondents were asked to choose the response that best reflected their level of religiosity from a list of options including: "not religious at all," "not religious," "neither religious nor not religious," "religious," and "very religious." The results of this question are depicted in Figure 8, which illustrates the religiosity rates of the study's participants.






Figure 8 illustrates the respondents' self-reported levels of religiosity. Over half of the participants (62%) indicated that they were either religious or very religious, while a small proportion (14%) stated that they were either not religious at all or not religious. The remaining 24% of participants described themselves as neither religious nor non-religious. These findings suggest that the majority of individuals living in Türkiye, approximately two-thirds, identify as religious to some degree. Subsequent figures (9, 10, and 11) examine the distribution of participants' religiosity by gender, age group, and education level, respectively. In addition, Figures 12 and 13 present the distribution of participants' views on religiosity by residential and geographical region.



The rate of those who describe themselves as religious is higher among women/females.

Figure 9 illustrates the relationship between gender and religiosity, as depicted by the results of the research. It is evident that, on average, women tend to perceive themselves as more religious than men perceive themselves. Specifically, 64% of the female participants in the study identified as "religious" or "very religious", compared to 61% of male participants.


Figure 10. Self-reported Religiosity by Age Groups



Less than half of the youngest age group identify as religious.

The distribution of self-reported religiosity levels by age group is depicted in Figure 10. It can be observed that as age increases, there is a marked increase in the proportion of individuals who self-identify as "religious" or "very religious". Only 47% of individuals aged 18-24, representing less than half, describe themselves as "religious" or "very religious". This rate increases to 65% for individuals aged 35-44, and reaches its peak at 80% for individuals aged 65 and above.

Figure 11. Self-reported Religiosity by Education




The lowest religiosity rate is among university students.

Figure 11 illustrates the inverse relationship between religiosity and education level. The data shows that as education level increases, religiosity significantly decreases. Among illiterate participants, 88% reported being "religious" or "very religious," while this rate decreases to 80% for primary school graduates, 68% for high school graduates, and 63% for college graduates. Notably, only 43% of participants continuing their university education identified as "religious" or "very religious."

Approximately one-quarter (24%) of university students identify as "not religious" or "not religious at all," while one-third (33%) claim to be "neither religious nor not-religious." It appears that religious self-identification rates are higher among university graduates and postgraduate or doctoral graduates than among current university students. Half (50%) of college graduates identify as religious, whereas this proportion drops to 44% among graduates or doctoral graduates.

Figure 11 presents data on the relationship between religiosity and educational attainment. The results indicate that there is a significant decline in religiosity as educational level increases. The vast majority (88%) of illiterate individuals describe themselves as "religious" or "very religious," while this figure decreases to 80% for primary school graduates, 68% for high school graduates, and 63% for college graduates. Notably, the rate of self-identification as religious drops to 43% among university students currently pursuing their education and only 50% of college graduates identify as religious. In contrast, 44% of postgraduate or doctoral graduates identify as religious. Additionally, 24% of university students report being "not religious" or "not religious at all," while 33% state that they are "neither religious nor not-religious." These findings suggest that religiosity tends to be higher among university graduates and postgraduate or doctoral graduates than among current university students.


Figure 12. Self-reported Religiosity in Rural and Urban Areas



Over three-quarters of the rural population identify themselves as religious.

Figure 12 illustrates the disparities in religiosity between rural and urban populations. The data demonstrates that there is a significant distinction between self-identification as religious among individuals living in rural areas compared to those living in urban areas. Specifically, 78% of individuals residing in rural areas identify as "religious" or "very religious," while only 61% of those living in urban areas do so. Additionally, there is a significant difference in the proportion of individuals who consider themselves "neither religious nor non-religious" between these two populations. Urban residents constitute 25% of this category, while only 10% of those living in rural areas do so. Furthermore, the number of urban residents who self-identify as "not religious" or "not at all religious" is more than twice that of rural residents.

Figure 13. Self-reported Religiosity by Geographical Regions



The most religious region is Northeast Anatolia.

The data depicted in Figure 13 illustrates the distribution of average religiosity levels among NUTS-1 regions. The Northeast Anatolia Region exhibits the highest average level of religiosity, with a rate of 80% for individuals who self-identify as "religious" or "very religious". The Eastern Black Sea region follows closely behind, displaying an average religiosity level of 75%. These adjacent northeast regions, therefore, contain the largest proportion of individuals who consider themselves to be "religious" or "very religious".


The least religious regions are West Marmara and Aegean.

According to Figure 13, the Western Marmara and Aegean regions exhibit the lowest levels of religiosity, with 46% and 47% respectively. The Aegean region is particularly noteworthy, as it has the highest rate of those who self-identify as "not religious" or "not religious at all" at 22%, followed closely by the Western Marmara region at 20%. In contrast, the Eastern Black Sea region has the lowest rate of non-religious individuals. The TFRS findings also illustrate the geographic distribution of religious and non-religious individuals in Türkiye through Map 2 and Map 3.

Map 2. Distribution of Religious People by Geographical Regions




Map 3. Distribution of Non-Religious People by Geographical Regions



In the online perception survey, participants were asked to predict the percentage of participants in Türkiye who identified as "religious" or "very religious" when asked about their general level of religiosity. The results of this survey, as depicted in Chart 2, were compared to findings from TFRS to gauge the accuracy of participants' perceptions.

Chart 2. Rates of Religiosity in Türkiye According to Perception and Research Findings




The level of religiosity in Türkiye is much higher than predicted.

According to Chart 2, which presents the estimates of religiosity predictions in conjunction with survey findings, the participants' average estimates were lower than the findings obtained in the field within the scope of the TFRS study. As depicted in Chart 2, the average rate of religiosity estimates among survey participants in Türkiye is 38%, while the average estimate of religiosity in Türkiye obtained from the field study is 62% (see Figure 8 for further detail). Therefore, it can be concluded that the majority of the participants in the online perception survey estimated a lower level of religiosity in Türkiye (38%) than the results obtained through the field study (62%).

Religious Practices


Prayer Frequency

Within the framework of the analyzed religious practices, the participants were first inquired about the frequency of their prayers. Figure 14 displays the prayer frequency of participants.



The rate of people in Türkiye who pray regularly is 39%.


The results of Figure 14 suggest that a greater proportion of individuals in Türkiye do not engage in frequent or regular prayer, with 41% reporting that they "never" or "rarely" pray, compared to 39% who pray "frequently" or "always". A smaller proportion of participants, 20%, reported praying "occasionally". To further examine the relationship between prayer practices and various demographic variables, Figures 15, 16, and 17 present the frequency of prayer by gender, age group, and education level, respectively. Figures 18 and 19 present the frequency of prayer by residential and geographical region.



Women have a higher rate of praying.

Figure 15 illustrates the relationship between gender and the frequency of prayer in Türkiye, showing that the rate of regular prayer is higher among women (40%) compared to men (37%).


Figure 16. Regular Prayer Frequency by Age Groups



One-fifth of youth under 25 pray five times a day.

Figure 16 presents the data on the frequency of prayer by age group, which reveals a clear trend of increased regularity in prayer as individuals age. The percentage of individuals who report praying "frequently" or "always" in the 18-24 age group is 20%, while this rate increases to 43% in the 35-44 age group and 68% in the 65 and over age group.


Figure 17. Regular Prayer Frequency by Education



As the level of education increases, the frequency of prayer decreases.

In Figure 17, the relationship between level of education and frequency of prayer is depicted. It can be observed that there is a marked decline in the frequency of prayer as the level of education increases. Among the illiterate respondents, 79% reported praying regularly. This percentage decreases to 63% among those who have completed primary education, 36% among those with a high school education, and 20% among university students. It is worth noting that the frequency of prayer among university graduates (32%) is higher than that among current university students. Additionally, the frequency of prayer among individuals with a master's or doctoral degree is 33%.


Figure 18. Regular Prayer in Rural and Urban Areas



Prayer frequency rates in rural areas are higher.

Figure 18 demonstrates the correlation between the residential status of individuals and their reported frequency of prayer. Results indicate that a greater proportion of participants residing in rural areas report praying "frequently" or "always" (52%) compared to those residing in urban areas (37%). Additionally, the frequency of prayer classified as "sometimes" is higher among rural participants compared to those in urban areas. This suggests that the prevalence of regular prayer is lower among the urban population compared to the rural population. The rate of participants who reported praying "rarely" or "never" is also higher in urban areas (43%) compared to rural areas (24%).

Figure 19. Regular Prayer Frequency by Geographical Regions



Central East and Southeast Anatolia regions have the highest frequency of prayers.

Figure 19 depicts the distribution of prayer frequency among different geographical regions (NUTS-1). The region with the highest percentage of participants who pray regularly is Central Eastern Anatolia, with approximately 63% indicating that they pray "always" or "frequently." Southeast Anatolia follows closely behind with a frequency rate of 60%.

Prayer frequency rates are low in the Aegean and West Marmara regions.

In the Aegean and West Marmara regions, the frequency of prayer is relatively low, with only 22% and 23%, respectively, of respondents indicating that they pray "frequently" or "always". In contrast, a significant proportion of individuals in these regions stated that they pray "rarely" or "never", with 58% and 66% of respondents in the Aegean and West Marmara regions, respectively, falling into this category. In Istanbul, a slightly higher percentage of respondents (33%) reported praying regularly, but almost half (47%) stated that they pray "rarely" or "never".


According to Figure 19, the rates of regular prayer are higher in Northern and Northeastern Türkiye than in Western Türkiye, particularly in comparison to the Aegean and Western Marmara regions. For instance, the Central East Anatolia Region exhibits a rate of regular prayer of 63%, which is nearly three times higher than the rate of 22% in the Aegean Region. Map 4, based on the findings of TFRS, illustrates the geographical distribution of respondents in Türkiye who engage in regular prayer.

Map 4. Distribution of Regular Prayer Practitioners by Geographical Regions



Within the online perception survey, participants were asked how many respondents answered the question about the frequency of praying five times a day in Türkiye as "often" or "always". The results of this inquiry are depicted in Chart 3, which compares the frequency of prayer estimates obtained from the perception survey with those obtained from the TFRS.

Chart 3. Proportion of Regular Prayer Practitioners in Türkiye According to Perception and Research Findings




The rate of those who regularly pray five times a day is higher than predicted.

According to Chart 3, the average estimated value for the percentage of people in Türkiye who pray regularly, as perceived by participants in the online survey, is 39.5%. However, the research findings depicted in Figure 14 indicate that the actual rate of those in Türkiye who pray regularly, i.e. frequently or always, is 38.7%. This data suggests that the rate of praying in Türkiye is slightly higher than predicted.

Fasting

In the survey, participants were inquired about their frequency of fasting during the month of Ramadan. The results, depicted in Figure 20, demonstrate the prevalence of fasting during Ramadan in Türkiye.


Figure 20. Frequencies of Fasting during Ramadan



The majority of Turkish people regularly fast during Ramadan.

In Figure 20, it can be observed that a significant proportion of the Turkish population engages in fasting during Ramadan, with 75% of participants reporting that they "frequently" or "always" observe this religious practice. However, a notable 16% of participants indicated that they "never" or "rarely" fast during Ramadan, while 9% stated that they "sometimes" participate in fasting. Figures 21, 22, and 23 provide further insight into the frequency of Ramadan fasting by examining the effects of gender, age group, and education level on this behavior. Additionally, Figures 24 and 25 examine the influence of residential and geographical regions on the prevalence of Ramadan fasting.


Figure 21. Frequency of Fasting during Ramadan by Gender



Women fast more often during Ramadan.

Figure 21 shows the fasting frequency during Ramadan by gender in Türkiye. The results show that women "frequently" or "always" fast more frequently than men, with 77% of women fasting regularly compared to 74% of men.


Figure 22. Frequency of Fasting during Ramadan by Age Groups



Fasting does not differ significantly between age groups.

According to Figure 22, there were no significant differences in the frequency of fasting during Ramadan among different age groups in Türkiye. The data indicated that 76% of respondents in the 18-24 age group, 73% in the 25-34 age group, 77% in the 35-44 age group, and 76% in the 45-64 age group stated that they fasted "frequently" or "always" during Ramadan. Interestingly, the rate of fasting regularly during Ramadan in the 65 and over age group, which is typically perceived as being more religious, was 74%. It is possible that the lower percentage of fasting in this group may be attributed to health issues that often arise with advancing age.

Figure 23. Frequency of Fasting during Ramadan by Education




Postgraduates fast the least.

Figure 23 illustrates the relationship between educational attainment and the frequency of fasting during Ramadan. The data reveals that as the educational level increases, the frequency of fasting decreases. The percentage of participants who fast regularly during Ramadan ranges from 76% to 83% among those with a high school education or lower, while this rate drops to 70% among university graduates and 64% among

those with a master's or doctoral degree. Additionally, the data shows that the proportion of participants who do not fast at all during Ramadan is highest among those with a master's or doctoral degree (29%).


Figure 24. Frequency of Fasting during Ramadan in Rural and Urban Areas



The frequency of fasting during Ramadan is similar in rural and urban areas.

Figure 24 illustrates the correlation between the location of participants' residential areas and the frequency of their fasting during Ramadan. The data reveals that 80% of participants residing in rural areas report fasting "frequently" or "always" (regularly) during Ramadan, while the same is true for 75% of those living in urban areas. It is worth noting that the prevalence of fasting during Ramadan is relatively high throughout Türkiye, with no significant difference between the rural and urban populations.

Figure 25. Frequency of Fasting during Ramadan by Geographical Regions




Half of the Aegean population fasts regularly.

The frequency of fasting during Ramadan in Türkiye is depicted in Figure 25, with data broken down by NUTS-1 regions. The Northeast Anatolia, Eastern Black Sea, and Central Anatolia regions exhibit the highest prevalence of fasting, with 99%, 93%, and 92% of their populations, respectively, indicating that they "frequently" or "always" fast. In contrast, the Aegean, Mediterranean, and West Marmara regions demonstrate


lower frequencies of fasting, with 53%, 61%, and 62% of their populations reporting regular fasting, respectively. Among those in the Aegean region, 31% stated that they "rarely" or "never" fast, with even lower rates seen in Istanbul (20%) and Mediterranean regions. Map 5 presents the geographic distribution of regular fasting in Türkiye based on the findings of the TFRS survey.

Map 5. Distribution of Regularly Fasting People by Geographical Regions



In the online perception survey, participants were asked to predict the prevalence of regular fasting during Ramadan among individuals in Türkiye. The results of this estimation, as depicted in Chart 4, are compared with findings from TFRS.

Chart 4. Predictions and Finding Rate of Fasting People in Türkiye




The rate of those fasting is precisely double what was predicted.

According to Chart 4, the average estimate of the percentage of respondents who fast during Ramadan is 37%. However, the research findings depicted in Figure 20 reveal that 74.8% of the participants consistently engage in fasting during Ramadan. These results demonstrate that the actual rate of those who fast during Ramadan is significantly higher than the estimated rate, with a specific discrepancy of twice the estimated rate.

Wearing a Headscarf

As part of the TFRS study, participants were inquired about the frequency with which they observe the religious practice of wearing a headscarf. Female participants were asked about their general practice of wearing headscarves in their daily lives. The aim of this question was to determine the proportion of women in Türkiye who consistently wear headscarves and those who only occasionally engage in this practice (e.g., at home or in public). The results, depicted in Figure 26, indicate the rate of Turkish women who have worn a headscarf in some capacity.


Figure 26. Women who wore a headscarf in some way or another



The percentage of women who wore a headscarf in some way (including irregularly) is 73%.

According to Figure 26, 73% of women in Türkiye report wearing a headscarf in some form. This indicates that nearly three-quarters of the female participants over the age of 18 in Türkiye engage in this practice. In contrast, 27% of the participants reported not wearing a headscarf at all. To further examine headscarf practices among women in Türkiye, Figures 27, 28, and 29 provide data on the frequency of headscarf use during different activities, such as outside the home, at home, or during worship. Additionally, Figures 30 and 31 provide information on headscarf usage among different age and education groups.


Figure 27. Frequency of wearing a headscarf outside among women.



Around half of the women regularly wear a headscarf when they go out.

Figure 27 illustrates the prevalence of headscarf use among women in Türkiye. According to the data, 48% of female participants reported wearing a headscarf "frequently" or "always" when going out, while 47% stated they "never" or "rarely" do so. A small percentage of 6% indicated that they "sometimes" wear a headscarf when going out.


Figure 28. Frequency of wearing a headscarf at home among women



Around a quarter of women also wear a headscarf at home.

According to Figure 28, approximately 27% of women in Türkiye reported wearing a headscarf "frequently" or "always" at home, while 58% reported "never" or "rarely" wearing a headscarf at home. The remaining 16% of participants indicated that they "sometimes" wear a headscarf at home.


Figure 29. Frequency of wearing a headscarf among women while worshipping



The percentage of women wearing headscarf while worshipping is 69%.

Figure 29 presents data on the frequency with which women in Türkiye wear headscarves while worshipping. The results show that the majority of women surveyed (69%) reported wearing headscarves either "frequently" or "always" during worship. In comparison to Figure 27, which looks at the frequency with which women wear headscarves when going out, it can be seen that the rate of headscarf wearing during worship increases from 48% to 69%. The remaining 30% of women stated that they "rarely" or "never" wore headscarves during worship. It is important to note that these findings do not indicate that these women do not engage in worship; rather, they simply do not wear headscarves during these activities.

Figure 30. Frequency of Wearing the headscarf Outside, at Home, and While Worshipping by Age Groups




The results of Figure 30 demonstrate the relationship between the frequency of headscarf wearing among female participants and their age group in various situations. It can be observed that there is an upward trend in the percentage of participants who report wearing headscarves "always" or "frequently" while outside, at home, and during worship as the age group increases. This suggests that headscarf wearing may be more prevalent among older female participants in these contexts.

One-third of the youngest age group wear a headscarf outside.

According to Figure 30, the prevalence of women wearing headscarves outside, at home, and while worshipping increases significantly with age. The percentage of women who regularly wear headscarves outside ranges from 33% in the 18-24 age group to 70% in the 65 and over age group. Similarly, the percentage of women who regularly wear headscarves at home increases from 15% in the 18-24 age group to 57% in the 65 and over age group. Additionally, the percentage of women wearing headscarves while worshipping rises from 61% in the 18-24 age group to 80% in the 65 and over age group. This trend is reflected in the declining rate of female participants who report "never" or "rarely" wearing the headscarf as their age increases.


Figure 31. Frequency of wearing headscarf outside, at home and while worshipping by education level



The rate of wearing the headscarf among higher education graduates declines to one in five.

The frequency of headscarf wearing among female participants is depicted in Figure 31 according to education level. It can be seen that as education level increases, there is a significant decline in the rate of women wearing headscarves in all three contexts (outside, at home, and while worshipping). For example, while all illiterate female participants report regularly wearing headscarves outside, this rate decreases to 86% among primary school graduates, 41% among high school graduates, 31% among university students, and 19% among those with a master's or doctoral degree. Similarly, the rate of regular headscarf wearing at home among illiterate female participants is 84%, but this rate decreases to 62% among primary school graduates, 20% among high school graduates, 11% among university students, and 4% among those with a master's or doctoral degree. Lastly, the rate of regular headscarf wearing during prayer among illiterate female participants is 100%, but this rate decreases to 93% among primary school graduates, 72% among high school graduates, 57% among university students, and 37% among those with a master's or doctoral degree.


Figure 32. Frequency of wearing a headscarf outside, at home and while worshipping by Residential Areas




In rural areas, three out of four women regularly wear headscarves outside.

In Figure 32, the prevalence of headscarf usage among women in both rural and urban settings is depicted. It is evident that there is a significant difference in headscarf usage between rural (74%) and urban (45%) populations. While a majority of women in rural areas (59%) report regularly wearing headscarves at home, the rate of headscarf usage at home in urban areas is significantly lower at 24%. Furthermore, the percentage of women who wear headscarves while worshipping is notably higher in rural areas (83%) compared to urban areas (67%).

Figure 33: Frequency of wearing a headscarf at home, outside, and while worshipping by NUTS-1 Regions





Southeast and Northeast Anatolia are the regions where women wear headscarves most often.

Figure 33 presents the data on the frequency of headscarf usage among female participants in different NUTS-1 regions in Türkiye. The regions with the highest percentage of women regularly wearing headscarves in all three situations are South East Anatolia (78%) and Northeast Anatolia (74%). However, this rate significantly decreases to 27% in the Aegean Region, where 67% of women reported rarely or never wearing a headscarf outside. In terms of wearing headscarves at home, 57% of women in South East Anatolia and 49% of those in Northeast Anatolia stated that they frequently or always do so. In contrast, 72% in the Aegean region, 68% in Istanbul, and 64% in the Mediterranean regions reported rarely or never wearing headscarves at home. The differences between regions in the rates of headscarf usage while worshipping are relatively minor in comparison to other situations. The rate of wearing headscarves while worshipping decreases from 78% in South East Anatolia to 53% in the Aegean region. The findings of TFRS are depicted in Map 6, which illustrates the geographical distribution of those in Türkiye who regularly wear headscarves.


Map 6. Distribution of Those Who Regularly Wear the headscarf by Geographical Regions



Perception of Wearing a Headscarf

The present study sought to explore the perception of the headscarf among Turkish individuals. To this end, participants were asked to rate their agreement with the following statements: "Women wearing headscarves can also serve as judges and prosecutors", "Women should cover their heads", and "The headscarf is a political symbol". The frequencies of participants' responses to these questions are depicted in Figure 34.

Figure 34. Perception of the headscarf in Türkiye



There is a broad consensus that women with headscarves can work in public offices.

Figure 34 illustrates the extent to which respondents in Türkiye agree or disagree with the statement "Women with headscarves can also be judges and public prosecutors." The data reveals that the majority of respondents, 85%, express agreement or strong agreement with this statement. In contrast, only 7% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree with this statement, while the remaining 7% neither agree nor disagree. These findings suggest that there is a general consensus in Türkiye that women with headscarves can hold positions in public offices, such as judges and public prosecutors.


A higher number of people think that women should wear a headscarf.

As depicted in Figure 34, 44% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "women should cover their heads," while 31% disagreed or strongly disagreed. Meanwhile, 26% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.

The headscarf is not recognized as a political symbol.

Furthermore, a majority of the participants (74%) indicated that they did not concur with the assertion that the headscarf is a political symbol. While a small percentage (14%) expressed agreement with this statement, a relatively equal proportion (12%) neither agreed nor disagreed. The distribution of responses to this statement according to gender, age group, and education level of the participants is illustrated in Figures 35, 36, and 37, respectively.

Figure 35. Perception of wearing the headscarf by Gender



Support for women wearing headscarves to work in public jobs is higher among women.

Figure 35 presents the results of a survey conducted to assess the perceptions of participants, separated by gender, on the ability of women wearing headscarves to serve as judges or prosecutors. A significant majority of both male (83%) and female (88%) respondents agreed with this statement. However, a small proportion of respondents, 9% of men and 6% of women, did not hold this belief. These findings suggest that the majority of participants do not view the wearing of a headscarf as a hindrance to the ability of women to serve in judicial roles.


Men are more likely to view the headscarf as a political symbol than women.

According to the survey results, a significant percentage of both male and female participants do not view the headscarf as a political symbol. For instance, 78% of male participants and 71% of female participants stated that they do not see the headscarf in this way. However, a smaller percentage of respondents, comprising 16% of males and 12% of females, indicated that they agree or strongly agree with the statement that the headscarf is a political symbol.

Women are more opposed to the concept of the necessity of wearing a headscarf.

According to Figure 35, there is a higher prevalence of agreement with the opinion that women should cover their heads among both male and female respondents. Specifically, 45% of men and 42% of women either agree or strongly agree with this statement. However, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the percentages of those who disagree or strongly disagree with this idea, with 27% of men and 34% of women expressing this sentiment. A minority of both male and female respondents (24% and 26%, respectively) neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. These findings suggest that men may be more supportive of the idea that women should wear headscarves compared to women.

Figure 36. Perception of wearing the headscarf by Age Group



Support for the necessity of wearing the headscarf increases with older age.


The results of Figure 36 demonstrate the perception of headscarf wearing women in various age groups in regards to their potential occupation as judges or public prosecutors. It can be observed that a majority of the respondents, ranging from 80-89%, agree or strongly agree that women wearing headscarves can hold such positions. However, there is a notable increase in the percentage of respondents who disagree with this statement in the 45-64 and 65 and over age groups, with 11% and 10%, respectively, compared to the lower rate of 4% in the 18-24 age group.

Furthermore, the majority of respondents in all age demographics reported that they did not view the headscarf as a political symbol. Data showed that between 72% and 76% of participants disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that "the headscarf is a political symbol," while only 12% to 17% agreed or strongly agreed with this statement across different age groups.

According to Figure 36, there is a significant difference in the rate of agreement with the statement "Women should cover their heads" across different age groups. Among those aged 18-24, the rate of agreement is 29%. However, this rate increases to 42% among those aged 25-34, 47% among those aged 35-44, 49% among those aged 45-64, and reaches the highest rate at 61% among those aged 65 and older. On the other hand, the rate

of disagreement with the statement decreases with age, with 31% of those aged 18-24 disagreeing, compared to only 23% of those aged 65 and over. This data suggests that support for the headscarf among women increases with age, with the oldest age group exhibiting twice the level of support as the youngest age group.

Figure 37. Perception of wearing the headscarf by Education




Postgraduates are less supportive of women working in public jobs while wearing a headscarf.

Figure 37 demonstrates the prevalence of agreement and disagreement with the statement regarding the perception of headscarves worn by women in the judiciary system in Türkiye. It is evident that a high percentage of participants, ranging from 80% to 96%, across various educational levels and age groups concur or strongly concur that "women wearing headscarves can also serve as judges or prosecutors". This suggests a general acceptance of the idea that headscarf-wearing women can serve in these positions.

Furthermore, the findings revealed that participants across all educational levels commonly viewed the headscarf as apolitical. The percentage of participants who indicated that they did not agree or strongly disagree with the notion that the headscarf is a political symbol ranged from 63% to 80%. Conversely, the percentage of participants who agreed or strongly agreed with this statement fluctuated between 9% and 19% at various educational levels.

As depicted in Figure 37, the proportion of illiterate participants who either agree or strongly agree with the notion that "Women should cover their heads" stands at 79%. This percentage decreases to 70% for those who have completed primary school, 43% for high school graduates, 27% for university students, and 26% for individuals holding a master's or doctoral degree. Conversely, the percentage of illiterate participants who disagree with this statement is 10%, while this rate increases to 44% among those holding a master's or doctoral degree. Thus, it can be inferred that support for the wearing of headscarves by women in public offices decreases with increasing levels of education.

Figure 38. Perception of wearing the headscarf in Rural and Urban Areas




There are significant differences between rural and urban areas in the perception that women should wear the headscarf.


Figure 38 presents data on the frequencies of agreement and disagreement among participants regarding the suitability of women wearing headscarves to serve as judges or prosecutors, stratified by residential area. Results indicate that both rural and urban populations demonstrated relatively high levels of agreement with this statement, with 89% of rural and 85% of urban residents agreeing or strongly agreeing. However, the

proportion of individuals who disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement was significantly higher in the urban population compared to the rural population, at twice the frequency.

The results of the study suggest that the majority of participants from both rural and urban settlements do not view the headscarf as a political symbol. Specifically, 75% of rural respondents and 74% of urban respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement "the headscarf is a political symbol." In terms of the belief that women should cover their heads, the data showed a significant difference between the rural and urban populations. While 68% of rural participants agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, only 32% of urban participants held this belief. Conversely, the rate of disagreement with this statement was higher among urban participants, at 32%, compared to 16% among rural participants. The perception of the headscarf among participants varied by geographic region, as depicted in Figure 39.

Figure 39. Perception of wearing the headscarf by Geographic Regions





In the Aegean region, the rate of those who say the headscarf is a political symbol is higher than in other regions.

It was reported by participants from all regions that they generally do not perceive the headscarf as a political symbol. Among the participants, the percentage who disagree or strongly disagree with the notion that the headscarf represents a political symbol ranges from 71% to 85%, depending on the geographic location. The highest proportion of participants who agree or strongly agree with this statement was found in the Aegean region (22%), while the lowest was observed in Central Anatolia (7%).

The Aegean region is the most hostile to the idea of women wearing headscarves while serving as judges and prosecutors.


Figure 39 presents data on the perception of headscarves among participants in various geographic regions, as indicated by their levels of agreement or disagreement with certain statements. The results indicate that there is relatively little variance in the rates of agreement among participants from different regions regarding the notion that women who wear headscarves can be judges or prosecutors. The majority of participants in each region (ranging from 82% to 91%) indicated agreement or strong agreement with this idea. The exception was the Aegean region, where the rate of disagreement was 13%.

The Northeast Anatolia Region has the highest rate of agreement with the statement that women should wear a headscarf.

According to Figure 39, the highest proportion of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "women should cover their heads" was found in Northeast Anatolia, with a rate of 75%. Southeast Anatolia and Central Anatolia had similar rates of 65% and 61%, respectively. In contrast, the Aegean region had the lowest rate of support for this statement, at only 20%. In this region, 53% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that women should wear headscarves. These findings, as

depicted in Map 7, indicate a clear geographical distribution of support for the wearing of headscarves by women as reported by TFRS.


Map 7. Distribution of those who support women wearing headscarves in public jobs



Secularism

TFRS investigated individuals' perceptions of secularism in Türkiye. As part of the study, participants were asked to provide their opinions on three statements: "I think religion can be easily practiced in a secular country," "No article in the Constitution should contradict the Qur'an," and "I think the state should have a religious character." The possible responses were "strongly disagree," "disagree," "neither agree nor disagree," "agree," and "strongly agree." The results, shown in Figure 40, indicate the frequency of the responses given by the participants to these statements.

Figure 40. Perception of Secularism in Türkiye



The majority believe that religion can be practiced easily in a secular country.

Figure 40 illustrates the percentage of participants who concurred with various statements that reflect their perspective on secularism. As can be seen, 73% of the participants either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "I believe that religion can be easily practiced in a secular country," while only 13% expressed disagreement or strong disagreement with this statement. The remaining 14% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed. This data suggests that there is a general consensus among the Turkish population that religion can be easily practiced within a secular society.


The majority believe that the state should not have a religious character.

Figure 40 illustrates that 47% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "No article in the Constitution should contradict the Qur'an," while 33% disagreed or strongly disagreed. An additional 21% reported neutral agreement or disagreement with this idea.

The majority believe that no article in the constitution should contradict the Qur'an.

Approximately half (47%) of respondents neither agreed nor strongly disagreed with the statement, "I think the state should have a religious character." Conversely, 38% of participants either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. Additionally, 15% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. To further examine the perception of secularism, Figures 41, 42, and 43 demonstrate the levels of agreement or disagreement with the aforementioned statement according to the gender, age group, and education level of the participants, respectively.

Figure 41. Perception of Secularism by Gender



Women are more in favor of secularism.

The data presented in Figure 41 demonstrates the perceptions of secularism among the study's participants based on gender. Close to half (49%) of male participants and 44% of female participants agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "No article in the Constitution should contradict the Qur'an." Additionally, 31% of male participants and 34% of female participants disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement, while 20% of female and 21% of male respondents did not clearly indicate their stance.


Furthermore, less than half of the male participants (42%) and slightly more than half of the female participants (52%) stated that they did not believe the state should have a religious character. In contrast, 43% of male and 33% of female participants agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "I think that the state should have a religious character," while the remaining 15% of male and 16% of female respondents neither agreed nor disagreed.

Figure 41 presents the results of a survey on the perception of secularism by gender. The data reveals that a slightly higher percentage of men, at 49%, agree or strongly agree with the statement "No article in the Constitution should contradict the Qur'an" compared to 44% of women. Conversely, a higher percentage of women, at 34%, disagree or strongly disagree with this statement compared to 31% of men. Around 20% of men and 21% of women neither agree nor disagree with this statement.

Additionally, a significant portion of respondents, with 42% of male and 52% of female participants, do not believe that the state should have a religious character. However, 43% of male and 33% of female participants indicated that they agree or strongly agree with the statement "I think the state should have a religious character". The remaining 15% of men and 16% of women neither agree nor disagree with this argument.

Furthermore, the data indicates that a higher proportion of both men and women, at 75% and 70% respectively, believe that religion can easily be practiced in a secular country. In contrast, the percentage of those who do not think religion can be easily practised in a secular country is lower, at 16% for men and 10% for women. The remaining 14% of both men and women neither agree nor disagree with this statement.

Figure 42. Perception of Secularism by Age Group



The old and the young think similarly about the practicability of religion in a secular country


Figure 42 presents the findings about perception of secularism among participants of different age groups. It appears that there is a correlation between age and the level of agreement with the statement "No article in the Constitution should contradict the Qur'an." The percentage of those who agreed or strongly agreed with this statement increased from 36% in the 18-24 age group to 50% in the 35-44 age group, and further to 61% in the 65 and over age group. On the other hand, the percentage of those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement decreased from 37% in the 18-24 age group to 30% in the 45-64 age group, and further to 26% in the 65 and over age group.

According to Figure 42, there appears to be a positive correlation between age and the belief that the state should possess a religious character. The data shows that the proportion of participants who agree with this statement increases as the age group increases. The rate of agreement is 26% among those in the 18-24 age group, 42% among those in the 35-44 age group, and 53% among those 65 and over. Conversely, the percentage of those who disagree with this statement decreases as the age group increases, with 53% disagreement among those in the 18-24 age group, 42% among those in the 45-64 age group, and 40% among those 65 and over.

Figure 42 illustrates the perceptions of secularism among different age groups through their rates of agreement or disagreement with several statements. It can be observed that the percentage of individuals who concur with the statement "No article in the Constitution should contradict the Qur'an" increases as the age group increases. While 36% of individuals in the 18-24 age group agree or strongly agree with this statement, this percentage increases to 50% among those in the 35-44 age group and 61% among those 65 and older. Similarly, the proportion of respondents who believe the state should have a religious character also increases with age, with 26% of individuals in the 18-24 age group agreeing or strongly agreeing with this statement, compared to 42% in the 35-44 age group and 53% among those 65 and older. In contrast, the rate of individuals who disagree or strongly disagree with these statements decreases with age.

Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who believe that religion can be easily practiced in a secular country is higher across all age groups compared to those who do not hold this belief. The ratio of individuals who agree or strongly agree with this statement ranges from 70% to 75% across different age groups, while those who disagree or strongly disagree range from at least 10% in the 18-24 age group to at most 16% in the 35-44 age group.

Figure 43. Perception of Secularism by Education




University students are among the highest percentage advocating that religion can be practiced easily in a secular country.

According to Figure 43, there is a negative correlation between education level and agreement with the statement "No article in the Constitution should contradict the Qur'an." The rate of agreement among illiterate individuals is 65%, while it decreases to 47% among high school graduates and further to 33% among individuals with master's or doctoral degrees. Similarly, the rate of disagreement or strong disagreement with this statement increases from 12% among the illiterate to 29% among high school graduates and 46% among those with advanced degrees.

The level of education has a significant impact on individuals' views on the relationship between religion and the state. A higher level of education is correlated with a lower belief that the state should have a religious character. The majority (79%) of illiterate individuals agree or strongly agree with this statement, while only 38% of high school graduates, 25% of university students, and 23% of those with master's or doctoral degrees hold this belief. On the other hand, the proportion of individuals who disagree with the statement increases with educational level, with 15% of illiterates disagreeing, 44% of high school graduates, 57% of university students, and 67% of those with master's or doctoral degrees disagreeing.

Additionally, the data shows that a higher level of education is also associated with a greater belief that religion can be easily practiced in a secular country. Among illiterate participants, 54% agree or strongly agree with this statement, compared to 80% of university students. Rates at other levels of education range from 63% to 77%. It is noteworthy that university students have the highest level of support for this belief, with only 9% disagreeing, compared to 19% of illiterates. At other education levels, the rate of disagreement ranges from 11% to 17%. Figure 44 illustrates the relationship between participants' residential areas and their perceptions of secularism.

Figure 44. Perception of Secularism by Residential Areas



Support for secularism is higher in urban areas

The results depicted in Figure 44 show that there is a significant difference in the perception of secularism between participants living in rural and urban areas. A greater proportion of participants living in rural areas (57%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "No article in the Constitution should be in conflict with the Qur'an," compared to 46% of participants living in urban areas. Furthermore, the rate of participants who did not agree or strongly disagree with this statement was higher in urban areas (34%) compared to rural areas (21%). Additionally, the rate of participants who neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement was 22% in rural areas and 21% in urban areas.


When examining the perception of whether the state should have a religion, the results also vary between urban and rural areas. The proportion of participants who agree or strongly agree with the statement "I think that the state should have a religious character" was higher among those living in rural areas (57%) compared to urban areas (36%). Conversely, a greater proportion of urban participants (49%) answered "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with this statement, compared to 28% of rural participants. Furthermore, 15% of the rural population and 21% of the urban population stated that they "neither agree nor disagree" with this statement.


The perception of secularism among respondents in different residential areas is demonstrated in Figure 44. There is a notable distinction between the rural and urban populations in terms of their agreement with the statement "No article in the constitution should contradict the Qur'an". While 57% of the rural respondents agree or strongly agree with this statement, only 46% of the urban respondents do so. Additionally, the proportion of those who disagree or strongly disagree with this statement is higher among the urban population (34%) compared to the rural population (21%). However, a considerable number of respondents from both the rural (22%) and urban (21%) populations neither agree nor disagree with this statement.

Furthermore, the level of agreement between the rural and urban populations concerning the idea that the state should have a religious character is significantly different. While 57% of the rural respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement "I think the state should have a religious character", this rate drops to 36% for the urban population. A large number of urban respondents (49%) indicated that they did not agree or strongly disagree with this statement, while the corresponding percentage for the rural population is 28%. Similarly, 15% of the rural respondents and 21% of the urban respondents neither agree nor disagree with this expression.

There is also a slight variation in the views of rural and urban respondents on the possibility of practicing religion in a secular country. As shown in Figure 44, the rate of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the statement "I think religion can be easily practised in a secular country" is higher among urban respondents (73%) compared to rural respondents (67%). However, the proportion of those who disagree or strongly disagree with this statement is similar for both populations (15% for rural and 13% for urban). The percentage of respondents who neither agree nor disagree with this statement is 18% for the rural population and 14% for the urban population.

Figure 45. Perception of Secularism by Geographic Regions





Northeastern and Southeastern Anatolian regions agree most with the view that no article in the Constitution should contradict the Qur'an.

Figure 45 presents the results of a survey on the perceptions of secularism among NUTS-1 regions in Türkiye. The data indicates that the highest rates of agreement with the statement "No article in the constitution should contradict the Qur'an" were found in the Northeast Anatolia (62%) and Southeast Anatolia (61%) regions. In contrast, the Aegean region had the lowest rate of agreement with this statement, at 29%. Additionally, 51% of respondents in the Aegean region indicated that they did not agree or strongly disagree with this statement, while this rate was significantly lower in the Northeast Anatolia region, at 18%. Overall, these findings suggest that there are regional differences in perceptions of secularism in Türkiye.

The Southeastern Anatolia region mostly agrees that the state should have a religious character.


According to Figure 45, the Southeastern Anatolia region is where most respondents concur that the state should possess a religious character, with 57% agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement "I think the state should have a religious character." In contrast, 67% of participants in the Aegean region disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.

Western Marmara Region is the region that supports secularism the most.

The results depicted in Figure 45 demonstrate that a majority of participants from various regions concur with the notion that religion can be practiced effectively in a secular country. The West Marmara region exhibited the highest percentage of individuals who agreed or strongly agreed with this statement at 84%, followed by the Aegean and Eastern Black Sea regions at 80%. However, the Northeast Anatolia region had a lower percentage of individuals who held this belief at 59%. While a small percentage of individuals from the West Marmara region disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement at 6%, the Central East Anatolia region

had the highest proportion of dissenters at 21%. Additionally, 9% of participants from the West Marmara region abstained from taking a clear position on this matter.

Map 8. Geographical distribution of people who say the state should have a religious character



Freedom of Belief and Lifestyle


TFRS survey included questions for exploring individuals on freedom of belief and lifestyle in Türkiye. For example, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statements "Religious Muslims can practice their religion freely in Türkiye" and "Secular people can live their lives freely in Türkiye". Respondents were given the options to choose from "strongly disagree", "disagree", "neither agree nor disagree", "agree", or "strongly agree". The frequency of responses to these questions is depicted in Figure 46.

Figure 46. Freedom of Belief and Lifestyle in Türkiye



Results from Figure 46 reveal that 64% of participants agree with the statement "Secular people in Türkiye can live their lives freely," while 22% disagree or strongly disagree with this statement. 14% of participants did not explicitly express their agreement or disagreement. Upon examining the data, it becomes apparent that there is a perception that the freedom of religious individuals to practice their beliefs in Türkiye is perceived to be higher than the freedom of secular individuals to maintain their lifestyles. To further investigate this issue, Figures 47, 48, and 49 examine the distribution of participants' freedom of belief and lifestyle based on gender, age, and education levels. Additionally, Figures 50 and 51 examine the distribution of participants' views on freedom of belief and lifestyle based on residential and geographical regions.

Figure 47. Freedom of Belief and Lifestyle by Gender




Women and men have different views on freedom.

Figure 47 demonstrates the perceptions of respondents regarding the freedom of belief and lifestyle in relation to gender. The data reveals that there is a disparity in the views of male and female respondents on the freedom of religious Muslims to engage in their religious practices in Türkiye. Of the male respondents, 85% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "Religious Muslims can practice their religion freely in Türkiye," while 82% of female respondents held the same belief. Conversely, 6% of male respondents and 8% of female respondents disagreed with this statement. Additionally, 9% of male respondents and 10% of female respondents neither agreed nor disagreed.

A gender-based analysis of Figure 47 reveals that women perceive secular individuals as having less freedom to lead their desired lifestyles in comparison to men. The data indicates that 69% of men agreed with the statement "Secular people can live their lives freely in Türkiye," while only 60% of women concurred. Furthermore, the percentage of men who disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement was 18%, while the corresponding rate for women was 25%. 13% of men and 15% of women abstained from expressing an opinion on this issue.

Figure 48. Freedom of Belief and Lifestyle by Age Group




There are significant differences among age groups regarding the perception of freedoms.

Figure 48 illustrates the distribution of respondents' views on the freedom of belief and lifestyle according to age groups in Türkiye. The data reveals that as the age group increases, the percentage of those who agree with the statement that both religious and secular individuals can live their lives freely also increases. For example, 76% of participants in the 18-24 age group agreed with the statement "Religious Muslims in Türkiye can freely practice their religion," compared to 83% in the 35-44 age group and 95% in the 65 and over age group. On the other hand, the rate of those who disagree or strongly disagree with this statement was 9% in the 18-24 age group, 7% in the 35-44 age group, and 4% in the 65 and over age group. Additionally, 14% of the 18-24 age group did not explicitly state their agreement or disagreement with this statement, while this rate decreased to 11% in the 35-44 age group and to 2% in the 65 and over age group.

According to Figure 48, there is a significant difference in the percentage of participants who agree or strongly agree that secular individuals in Türkiye can live their lives freely based on age. Around half (49%) of the individuals in the 18-24 age group agree or strongly agree with this statement, while 72% and 78% of those in the 35-44 and 65 and over age groups, respectively, hold this belief. Conversely, the rate of disagreement with this statement decreases with age, with 29% of those in the 18-24 age group disagreeing, 19% in the 35-44 age group, and only 11% in the 65 and over age group. Additionally, there is a notable proportion of individuals in

the 18-24 age group (22%) who neither agree nor disagree with this statement, while this rate decreases to 9% and 11% in the 35-44 and 65 and over age groups, respectively.

Figure 49. Freedom of Belief and Lifestyle by Education




People with lower levels of education believe that secular people are relatively free to pursue their lifestyles.

Figure 49 presents the rates of agreement or disagreement with statements indicating the participants' perceptions of freedom of belief and lifestyle, based on their level of education. The results demonstrate that the belief that religious individuals in Türkiye can live their lives freely is generally accepted across all levels of education. The percentage of participants who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "Religious Muslims in Türkiye can freely practice their religion" ranged from 80% (university graduates) to 88% (illiterate).

Figure 49 demonstrates that the perception that secular individuals in Türkiye have the ability to live freely without interference varies significantly with education level. Primary school graduates had the highest rate of agreement at 78%, while high school graduates had a lower rate of agreement at 63%. This trend reversed among university students, with only 46% agreeing with the statement. However, a slight increase in

agreement was observed among those with a university degree or higher, with 57% of university graduates and 56% of those with a master's or doctoral degree expressing agreement or strong agreement. Conversely, the rate of disagreement or strong disagreement with the statement increased from 9% among illiterates to 22% among high school graduates, and further to 34% among university students. This rate remained similar among university graduates and those with a master's or doctoral degree, at 31% and 33%, respectively.

Figure 50. Freedom of Belief and Lifestyle by Residential Areas




People in urban areas think that freedoms are more restricted.

In Figure 50, the rates of agreement or disagreement with the statements regarding the participants' perceptions of freedom of belief and lifestyle according to the regions of residence are presented. The results indicate that compared to the urban population, the rural population is more likely to agree with the statements that both religious Muslims and secular people in Türkiye can worship freely and live their lives freely. The majority (89%) of the participants living in rural areas agree or strongly agree with the statement, "Religious Muslims in Türkiye can freely practice their religion, and secular people can live their lives freely", while this rate decreases to 83% among the participants living in urban areas. Additionally, the rate of those who disagree with this statement is 3% in the rural population and 7% in the urban population. A small percentage of participants, 8% in the rural population and 10% in the urban population, answered "neither agree nor disagree" to this statement.

Additionally, the data presented in Figure 50 indicates that a higher proportion of participants residing in rural areas (77%) concurred with the statement "In Türkiye, secular individuals can live their lives freely" compared to those living in urban areas (63%). Conversely, a higher percentage of urban residents (23%) expressed disagreement or strong disagreement with this statement, while only 11% of rural participants did so. It should also be noted that a small percentage of both rural (12%) and urban (14%) participants did not explicitly state their agreement or disagreement with the statement.

Figure 51. Freedom of Belief and Lifestyle by Geographical Areas



Eastern Black Sea and Northeast Anatolia regions consider that secular people have a broad range of freedoms.

Figure 51 presents data on the levels of agreement or disagreement with statements related to freedom of belief and lifestyle in Türkiye by NUTS-1 region. It is evident that, across all regions, the percentage of respondents agreeing with the statements that both religious Muslims and secular individuals have the freedom to practice their respective beliefs and lifestyles surpasses that of those who disagree. Upon examining the figure, it is noteworthy that the highest rates of agreement with the statement "Religious

Muslims in Türkiye can freely practice their religion" can be observed in the Northeast Anatolia, Southeast Anatolia, and West Marmara regions at 92%, 89%, and 89%, respectively. Conversely, the lowest rate of agreement with this statement was recorded in Central Anatolia at 78%. In contrast, the regions with the highest rates of disagreement with this statement were Central Anatolia (15%), followed by the Mediterranean (10%) and Aegean (9%) regions.


Aegean and West Marmara regions are the regions least likely to agree that the freedom to lead a secular lifestyle is sufficient.

According to the data presented in Figure 51, the Northeast Anatolia and Eastern Black Sea regions exhibit the highest level of agreement with the statement "Secular individuals in Türkiye can live their lives freely," with 85% and 81% of participants, respectively, expressing agreement or strong agreement. Conversely, the Aegean Region displayed the lowest level of agreement, with only 50% of participants expressing agreement or strong agreement. Additionally, the Aegean Region also had the highest rate of disagreement or strong disagreement with this statement, at 35%, followed by the West Marmara region at 32% and Istanbul at 26%.

Identities

As part of the TFRS study, participants were asked to rate their proximity to various identity categories in order to better understand how individuals in Türkiye related themselves with major identity categories. These categories included "Muslim," "Nationalist," "Islamist," "Ataturkist" (*Ataturkçü*), "Religious," "Secular" (*Laik*), "Sunni," "Humanist," "Rightist," "Conservative" (*Muhafazakar*), "Socialist," "Leftist," "Feminist," "LGBT+ rights advocate," "Alevi," "Deist," and "Atheist," and were rated on a scale from 1 (farthest) to 5 (closest). The results of this analysis are depicted in Figure 52, which displays the distribution of respondents' degree of proximity to the various identity categories in Türkiye.

Figure 52. Degrees of Proximity to Identity Categories in Türkiye



Muslim is the most widely accepted identity.

According to Figure 52, which presents data on the level of identification of participants with various identity categories in Türkiye, the identity that individuals in Türkiye feel the strongest connection to is their "Muslim" identity. A significant proportion of participants, comprising 80%, reported feeling closely related to this identity, while only a small percentage (9%) stated that they felt distant from it.

The categories of nationalism, Islamism, Ataturkism, religiosity and secularism are approximately the same.

According to the research findings, a significant proportion of participants in Türkiye self-identify as nationalist (53%), Islamist (53%), Ataturkist (53%), religious (52%), and secularist (52%). Additionally, 50% of participants reported a strong connection to Sunni identity. These results suggest that identities related to religion, nationalism, and secularism hold approximately equal weight in Turkish society.


One-fifth of the society considers themselves to be close to feminism.


It was found that approximately half of the participants (42%) identified strongly with the humanist identity. In terms of feminist identification, 20% of the participants reported feeling close to this identity, with one in every five individuals in Türkiye identifying as such. Additionally, 22% of the participants identified with the leftist identity. A significant number of participants also identified with socialist (33%), conservative (35%), and right-wing (36%) identities. The percentage of those who identified with the LGBT+ rights advocacy was 11%.


Minority religious groups are the least represented identities.

Additionally, as depicted in Figure 52, the identities that respondents reported feeling the least connected to were atheism (4%), deism (8%), and Alevi (9%), in descending order.

Figure 53. Degrees of Proximity to Identity Categories by Gender







Women are generally closer to secular ideologies.

Figure 53 presents the data on the proximity of individuals to various identity categories based on their gender. The research results indicate that females tend to feel closer to secular-ideological identity categories than males. For example, while 48% of females identified with the humanist identity category, this percentage decreased to 37% among males. Similarly, 56% of females reported feeling close to the secularist identity category, compared to 47% of males. This trend is also evident in those who feel close to the Atatürkist identity category, with 58% of females and 47% of males indicating a close identification with Atatürkism.

Socialism is more accepted among women.


It was found that 37% of female participants identified with a socialist identity, while only 29% of male participants identified with this identity. Additionally, 33% of women reported feeling a strong connection to a feminist identity, compared to only 8% of men.


Men feel closer to traditional identity categories.






As seen in Figure 53, men generally report a stronger identification with traditional identity categories compared to women. Male participants indicated that they consider themselves to be more closely aligned

with nationalist (59%), Sunni (54%), religious (54%), conservative (37%), and rightist (39%) identity categories. In contrast, the respective rates among female participants were 50%, 45%, 51%, 34%, and 32%. Interestingly, the percentage of women who identified with the Islamist identity category (55%) was slightly higher than the rate among men (52%). Among both male and female respondents, the rates of those who identified with the identity groups of atheist, deist, and LGBT+ rights advocates were lower than those of other identity categories.


Figure 54. Degrees of Proximity to Identity Categories by Age Group







■ 1 - Farthest
 ■ 2
 ■ 3
 ■ 4
 ■ 5 - Closest



Young people are more inclined towards secular and modern ideologies.


Figure 54 presents the degree of identification with various identity categories among individuals of different ages. The data indicates that younger individuals tend to be more closely aligned with secular and modern identity categories, while older individuals are more likely to identify with religious and traditional categories such as "Muslim," "Sunni," "Nationalist," "Islamist," "Religious," and "Conservative." For instance, 90% of individuals aged 65 and above report a strong identification with the "Muslim" category, while only 66% of those in the 18-24 age group do so.


Conversely, the data shows that the levels of closeness to atheist and deist identity categories are significantly higher among younger age groups. The rate of individuals in the 65 and above age group who consider themselves close to the atheist identity is 2%, with a 4% rate for those who regard themselves close to the deist identity. These rates increase to 5% and 11% in the 18-24 age group, respectively. Overall, these findings suggest that age plays a significant role in shaping an individual's sense of identity.


The feeling of closeness to feminism and LGBT+ advocacy identities is high among the elderly.


As depicted in Figure 54, the perception of a close association with the feminist identity decreases with age. For instance, 34% of the 18-24 age group consider themselves highly connected to feminist identity, whereas this percentage drops to 11% among the 35-44 age group. However, the proportion of individuals who consider themselves highly connected to feminist identity rises again in older age groups, reaching 15% in the 45-64 age group and 26% in the 65 and over age group. A similar trend is observed in the perception of a close association with the identity of LGBT+ rights defenders. While the rate of perceived proximity to this identity category is 22% in the 18-24 age group, it decreases progressively with increasing age and reaches 6% in the 45-64 age group. Nevertheless, this ratio increases among the oldest age group, those aged 65 and over, reaching 10%.


Figure 55. Degrees of Proximity to Identity Categories by Education














There is a significant relationship between the level of education and closeness to social identity categories.

The results depicted in Figure 55 demonstrate a clear correlation between respondents' level of education and their identification with various identity categories. Those with lower levels of education tend to exhibit a stronger affinity towards traditional and religious identities, while those with higher levels of education are more likely to align with modern and secular identities.

University students perceive themselves as the furthest away from Islam, Sunnism, religiosity and conservatism.

Results from Figure 55 demonstrate a negative correlation between levels of education and perceived proximity to Islamist and religious identity categories. Specifically, 85% of respondents who are illiterate identified as feeling closest to the Islamist identity. This percentage decreases to 34% for university students and 24% for those with master's and doctoral degrees. In contrast, there is a positive relationship between education attainment and identification with humanist, secularist, and leftist identity categories. For example, 23% of illiterate respondents consider themselves close to the humanist identity category, while this

percentage increases to 49% among university students and 56% among those with master's and doctoral degrees.

It has been found that a higher level of education is correlated with a stronger identification with the secularist and leftist identity categories. Among illiterate respondents, 14% identified as secularist, while this percentage rose to 58% among university students and 65% among those with master's and doctoral degrees. Similarly, the percentage of respondents identifying as leftist increased from 5% among illiterate individuals to 24% among university students and 27% among those with advanced degrees.

These findings suggest that university education may have a significant impact on a person's identification with certain identity categories. It is possible that higher education may expose students to different perspectives and ideas, leading to a shift in their identification with certain groups. This could be especially true for university students in regards to the Sunni and Muslim identities, as they are the most significant decreases in identification compared to other education levels. It is also worth noting that university students show the lowest rates of proximity to conservative and right-wing identities, indicating a possible shift towards more liberal or left-leaning views among this group. Overall, these findings suggest that university education may play a role in shaping a person's identification with certain identity categories.

University students are also the group that feels closest to feminism and LGBT+ rights advocacy.

University students were found to have the highest affinity for feminist and LGBT+ rights advocacy identity categories compared to participants from other education levels. The proportion of university students who identified with feminism was 37%, while the percentage was lower for college graduates at 23% and university graduates at 22%.

Those who feel closest to deism are university students.

The data depicted in Figure 55 demonstrates that a higher proportion of individuals holding a master's or doctoral degree identify closely with the atheist identity group compared to university students and illiterates. Specifically, 11% of master's or doctorate holders identified closely with this group, compared to 5% of university students and 0% of illiterates.

Those closest to atheism are the ones with master's and doctoral degrees.

The results of the survey show that 15% of university students identified with the deist identity category, while this rate decreased to 12% among university graduates and 10% among postgraduate and college graduates. It was found that lower levels of education were associated with a lower percentage of individuals identifying with this category.


As the level of education increases, so does the proximity to secular identities.


A trend of increasing identification with secular identity categories, including secularism, leftism, humanism, Atatürkism, socialism, and leftism, can be observed in Figure 55 as educational attainment increases. The percentage of illiterate respondents who reported a close identification with these categories was 14%, while those with postgraduate education exhibited a rate more than four times higher at 65%.


Nationalism is more prevalent at primary and secondary education levels.

According to Figure 55, there is a positive correlation between levels of education and feelings of national identity. Participants with secondary education reported the highest levels of identification with the nationalist identity category, with a rate of 59%. In contrast, those with lower levels of education, such as illiteracy and elementary school graduation, demonstrated a slightly lower identification with this category, at 32% and 51% respectively. However, those with higher levels of education, including master’s and doctoral degrees and university students, displayed a decrease in identification with the nationalist identity category, with rates of 51% and 44%, respectively.

Figure 56. Degrees of Proximity to Identity Categories by Residential Areas







Religious-traditional identities are prominent in rural areas.

A representation of the proximity of individuals to various identity categories based on their place of residence can be observed in Figure 56. It is evident that individuals residing in rural areas tend to feel a stronger connection to religious and traditional identities compared to those in urban areas. This is reflected in the higher percentage of those who identify closely with religious identity in rural areas, at 73%, compared to the lower percentage in urban areas, at 50%. This pattern is also observed in Islamist, conservative, Sunni, and rightist identity groups.


Urban areas are in the lead in terms of closeness to nationalist identity.


The rural population tends to align more with religious and traditional identity categories compared to the urban population, but the latter exhibits a slightly higher affinity towards nationalism. In particular, 51% of the rural population expresses a strong connection to nationalist identity, while this percentage increases to 55% among the urban population.


Leftism, socialism, secularism and Ataturkism are more common in urban areas.


Figure 56 illustrates that the urban population exhibits a stronger affinity for leftist and secular identities compared to the rural population. The urban population displays a higher proportion of individuals identifying as Ataturkist and secularist, at 54% and 53%, respectively, in contrast to the 37% and 32% found in the rural population. Additionally, the urban population exhibits a higher proportion of respondents identifying with socialist ideologies at 34%, as compared to the 21% found in the rural population. The proportion of respondents in the urban population identifying as leftists is also significantly higher at 23%, compared to the 8% found in the rural population. Furthermore, the urban population demonstrates a higher proportion of individuals identifying with modern and secular identities, such as atheism, deism, feminism, humanism, and support for LGBT+ rights.


Figure 57. Degrees of Proximity to Identity Categories by Geographic Regions
























Northeast Anatolia is the region that feels closest to religious and traditional identities.

Results indicate that, among the 12 statistical regions in Türkiye, the Northeast Anatolia region has the highest proportion of respondents who report a close connection to traditional and religious identity categories. This region has a higher percentage of respondents who identify as Muslim (91%), Islamist (74%), religious (73%), conservative (59%), Sunni (61%), and rightist (49%) compared to other regions. Figure 57 illustrates the proximity to various identity categories according to NUTS-1 regions.

The regions with the highest nationalist identity are the Eastern Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

Another finding is that the regions with the lowest levels of acceptance of nationalist identity are Central Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia, with 32% and 34%, respectively. On the other hand, the Eastern Black Sea and Mediterranean regions stand out as the regions with the highest levels of acceptance of nationalist identity, with 69% and 68%, respectively.

The majority in the Aegean and Western Marmara regions are close to secularism and Atatürkism.

Figure 57 reveals that the Atatürkist and secular identity categories are particularly popular in the Aegean and West Marmara regions. In this context, a majority of respondents in the Aegean region (78%) stated that they identify with the Atatürkist identity. This percentage is similarly high in the West Marmara region, where 70% of respondents feel close to this identity. Additionally, the Aegean region also exhibits a strong connection to other secular identity categories, with 70% of respondents identifying as secularist. This is followed by the West Marmara region, where 68% of respondents feel close to this identity. In contrast, the Northeast Anatolia region displays the lowest level of proximity to secular identity, with only 26% of respondents identifying with this category.

Only a quarter of the Central Anatolia region feels close to Ataturkism.

The Central Anatolia region showed the lowest level of identification with Ataturkist identity, with only 23% of participants expressing a sense of closeness to this identity.

West Marmara is the region where humanism is most accepted.

The West Marmara region, located in close proximity to the secular and modern identity categories of the Aegean region, exhibits a high percentage (58%) of individuals identifying with the humanist identity. This region stands out as a notable area in Türkiye where respondents exhibit a strong sense of connection to this identity.


Aegean Region is in the lead in feminism.

The Aegean region exhibits the highest prevalence of identification with feminist ideology, with a rate of 33%. This means that approximately one third of individuals in this region identify with feminism. In addition, this region also has a higher proportion of respondents who identify with advocacy for LGBTQ+ rights (21%) compared to other areas. On the other hand, the Northeast Anatolia region has the lowest proportion of respondents who identify with feminist and LGBTQ+ rights advocacy, with only 5% identifying with each of these identities.

Central East Anatolia has the highest rate of people feeling closest to Alevi identity.

Figure 57 illustrates that the Central Eastern Anatolia region exhibits the highest rate of closeness to Alevi identity at 18%. This is followed by the Western Marmara region at 13% and Istanbul at 11%. However, the Eastern Black Sea region stands out as having the lowest rate of proximity to the Alevi identity category at 2%. The geographical distribution of those who feel close to the secular, conservative, and feminist identities are depicted in Maps 9 through 11, respectively.

Map 9. Distribution of Respondents who feel Close to Secular Identity by Geographical Regions



Map 10. Distribution of Respondents who feel Close to Conservative Identity by Geographical Regions




Map 11. Distribution of Respondents who feel Close to Feminist Identity by Geographical Regions



Perception of Gender

The TFRS also study sought to examine individuals' perspectives on gender roles in Türkiye. To this end, the participants were presented with a series of statements related to gender roles and asked to indicate their level of agreement through response options ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." These statements included: "Women and men are different by nature," "Women should be more active in politics," "Women should also be able to attend Friday prayers in the mosque," "It is okay for a man and a woman to be lovers before marriage," "The head of the household is the man," "Boys and girls should study in separate classes," "A woman and a man can live together without marriage," and "It is wrong for women to engage in business life." The distribution of agreement rates for these statements is presented in Figure 64.

Figure 64. Perception of Gender in Türkiye



The overwhelming majority say that men and women are different in nature.

Figure 64 presents the response rates to statements regarding gender roles in Türkiye. As shown by the graph, a majority of participants (70%) either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "Women and men are different in nature." Conversely, a small percentage (16%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. The remaining 14% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.

The majority of people think that women should be more active in politics.

According to Figure 64, 49% of the participants indicated agreement with the statement "Women should be more active in politics," while 26% indicated disagreement. A total of 24% of the participants explicitly expressed either agreement or disagreement with this statement.

There is a high level of support for women to perform Friday prayers in mosques.

Survey findings indicate that 48% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "Women should also be able to perform Friday prayers in mosques," while 28% disagreed with the statement. The remaining 24% neither agreed nor disagreed with the notion that women should be allowed to pray Friday prayers in mosques.

The majority are in favour of men and women dating before marriage.

As demonstrated in Figure 64, 46% of participants in Türkiye responded affirmatively to the assertion "It is acceptable for a man and a woman to be intimate prior to marriage," while 34% rejected this statement. The remaining 20% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed.

The majority disagrees with the idea that "The man is the head of the household."

According to Figure 64, 40% of the participants expressed agreement or strong agreement with the assertion that "The man is the head of the household." In contrast, approximately half of the participants (47%) expressed disagreement or strong disagreement with this statement. The remaining 13% of the participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.

There is little support for gender-separate classrooms.

Over half of the surveyed participants (59%) expressed disagreement with the notion that boys and girls should be educated in separate classes, while 28% were opposed to the idea of mixed gender education. The remaining 12% were neutral on this issue.


A fifth of society tolerates partnerships without marriage.

The results of the study indicate that a significant portion of participants (68%) expressed disapproval of cohabitation among unmarried couples. A smaller percentage (21%) concurred with the notion that a man and a woman can reside together without the necessity of marriage. The remaining 11% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.

Majority support women's participation in business life.

Upon examining Figure 64, it can be noted that there is a low level of agreement among Turkish respondents with the statement "It is wrong for women to participate in business life." Only 11% of participants agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, while 77% disagreed or strongly disagreed. The remaining 12% neither agreed nor disagreed. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of gender perceptions in Türkiye, Figures 65, 66, and 67 present participants' views on gender roles based on gender, age group, and educational attainment. Additionally, Figures 68 and 69 provide insight into participants' gender perceptions based on residential area and geographical region.

Figure 65. Perception of Gender by Gender



According to women, women are inherently different from men.


Figure 65 illustrates the participants' views on gender roles according to their gender. As shown in the figure, although a higher percentage of women agree with the statement "Women and men are different in nature" compared to men, women exhibit less traditional attitudes towards other issues related to gender perception. While 16% of men agree or strongly agree with the statement "It is wrong for women to participate in business life," this rate decreases to 7% among women. Additionally, a higher percentage of women (50%) express favorable views towards dating before marriage compared to men (42%). Furthermore, while 34% of men


agree with the statement "Girls and boys should be educated in separate classrooms," this rate decreases to 23% among women, indicating a higher approval for coeducation among women than men.

Half of the men say, "The man is the head of the household."

According to Figure 65, 50% of male participants either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "The head of the house is the man." In contrast, 30% of males disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement, while 14% neither agreed nor disagreed. A lower percentage of women, 29%, agreed with this statement, with 59% indicating that the head of the house is not a man.

Figure 66. Perception of Gender by Age Group









Older and younger people have very different perceptions of gender.


Figure 66 illustrates variations in perceptions of gender among different age groups. It appears that older age groups tend to hold more traditional and conservative views on gender roles, while younger age groups tend to have a more liberal perspective. This is demonstrated by the finding that only 9% of participants aged 65 and over agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "A woman and a man can live together without marriage," compared to 33% of those aged 18-24. Additionally, the rate of those who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "The head of the household is the man" was higher in older age groups, with 21% in the 18-24 age group, 46% in the 35-44 age group, and 61% in the 65 and over age group. However, there was a notable exception to this trend, as the agreement rate with the statement "Women should be more active in politics" was higher in older age groups, with 48% of the 18-24 age group supporting more political involvement by women and 54% in the 65 and over age group.

Figure 67. Perception of Gender by Education






Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree



University students are the most distant group to traditional attitudes in terms of gender perception.

A relationship between education level and gender perception was identified in Figure 67, with those who had lower levels of education more likely to hold traditional gender perceptions. University students were the least likely to accept traditional gender roles among all the participants. For example, the percentage of participants who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "The head of the house is the man" decreased with increasing education level, from 81% among illiterate participants to 45% among primary school graduates and 21% among university students. However, this trend reversed among university graduates, with 31% agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement. This rate was 29% among those with a master's or doctoral degree. A similar trend was observed in the statement about women's participation in business, with university students showing the lowest support for the idea that "It is wrong for women to participate in business life." In addition, university students were more likely to agree with statements that challenged traditional gender roles, such as "There is no harm in a woman and a man being lovers before marriage," "Women should also be able to perform Friday prayers in the mosque," and "A woman and a man can live together without marriage."

Figure 68. Perception of Gender by Residential Areas





Gender perception is significantly different between rural and urban areas.



Figure 68 demonstrates the variance in gender perception among the participants according to their region of residence. The most striking difference was the perspective on cohabitation without marriage, with 22% of urban participants agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement "A woman and a man can live together without marriage," in contrast to only 9% of rural participants. Similarly, there were differences in views on mixed-gender education and female participation in business. For instance, 41% of rural participants agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "Girls and boys should be educated in separate classrooms," while this percentage decreased to 27% among urban participants. Additionally, the rate of those who believed it was

inappropriate for women to participate in the business world was more than twice as high in rural areas (22%) compared to urban areas (10%).


Figure 69. Perception of Gender by Geographic Regions







Strongly disagree
 Disagree
 Neither agree nor disagree
 Agree
 Strongly agree



The Northeast Anatolia Region is the most opposed to living without marriage; the Aegean Region is the most supportive.

Figure 69 presents data on the agreement rates with statements related to gender perception, organized according to NUTS-1 regions. The results indicate that only 6% of participants residing in Northeast Anatolia agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "A woman and a man can live together without marriage," whereas the rate increased to 38% in the Aegean Region. The Eastern Black Sea Region exhibited the second lowest level of support for cohabitation outside of marriage, at 7%, while the West Marmara Region showed the second highest level of support, at 30%.

Gender perception is more traditional in the Central and Eastern regions.

There is a significant variance in gender roles across the 12 statistical regions of Türkiye. The perceptions of gender roles among participants in the Western and coastal regions of the country were found to be less traditional compared to those in the Central and Eastern regions. For instance, Figure 69 reveals that the highest rate of participants who either agree or strongly agree with the statement "It is wrong for women to participate in business life" is found in Southeastern Anatolia at 28%. This is followed by Central Eastern Anatolia and Northeastern Anatolia, both at 16% and 15%, respectively. On the contrary, the regions with the lowest rates of agreement with this statement are West Marmara, Mediterranean, Aegean, and West Black Sea, all at 5%, 6%, 6%, and 6%, respectively. Additionally, while the percentage of participants who believe that the head of the household should be a man is 62% in Southeastern Anatolia, it decreases to 24% in the Aegean region. A similar trend is also observed in regards to supporting women's participation in politics, with the rate of those who either agree or strongly agree with the statement "Women should be more active in politics" being highest in the Aegean and West Marmara regions at 65% and 63%, respectively. In contrast, this rate was 37% in Central Eastern Anatolia, 36% in Northeastern Anatolia, and 34% in Southeastern Anatolia. According to the findings of TFRS, the geographical distribution of those who think that women's participation in business life is wrong and those who think that men should be the head of the household is presented in Maps 12 and 13, respectively.

Map 12. Geographical Distribution of Respondents Who Do Not Support Women's Participation in Business Life in Türkiye




Map 13. Geographical Distribution of Those Who Indicate that the Man is the Head of the Household in Türkiye



Quasi-Religious Practices

Several questions were included in the TFRS study for exploring the prevalence of quasi-religious behavior in Türkiye. Participants were asked to indicate the frequency with which they engaged in various activities, including distributing Ashura, visiting shrines, reciting the mawlid, making vows, interpreting dreams, consuming consecrated food or drink, performing istikhara, carrying amulets or jawshan, wearing evil eye beads, seeking healing from a hodja, engaging in fortune telling, undergoing cupping (Hijamah), creating totems, meditating, performing lead pouring to repel evil eye, practicing yoga, and seeking to have spells broken by a hodja. The distribution of these religious practices among individuals in Türkiye is presented in Figure 70.

Figure 70. Frequency of Quasi-Religious Practices in Türkiye





The most common religious practice is distributing Ashura; the least common practice is going to a hodja to break the spell (*sihr*).

According to Figure 70, which presents data on the frequency of quasi-religious practices in Türkiye, the distribution of Ashura is the most commonly practiced activity. Around two-thirds (76%) of participants reported engaging in this activity at least occasionally, while 24% indicated that they never engage in this activity. Other common quasi-religious practices in Türkiye include visiting shrines (71%), performing mawlid (70%), making vows (66%), and interpreting dreams (59%). In contrast, the least common quasi-religious activity in Türkiye is seeking the assistance of a hodja to break a spell, with only 9% of participants reporting

that they occasionally or frequently engage in this activity, while 91% indicated that they never do so. Further information on the frequency of quasi-religious practices in Türkiye is provided in Figures 71, 72, and 73, which present data by gender, age group, and education level, respectively. Figures 74 and 75 present data on the frequency of quasi-religious practices by residential region and geographical location.

Figure 71. Frequency of Quasi-Religious Practices by Gender





Women are more likely to have their dreams interpreted and fortunes read than men.


Figure 71 illustrates the gender-based frequency of quasi-religious practices. The results indicate significant differences in the frequency of these practices between men and women in Türkiye. As shown in the figure, women tend to engage in these practices more frequently than men. For instance, 39% of female participants reported engaging in fortune telling "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently," compared to only 18% of male


participants. Furthermore, 61% of women reported never engaging in this activity, while the corresponding rate for men was 82%. Similarly, the rate of women who "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently" interpret their dreams was 69%, compared to 50% of men. Conversely, 31% of women and 50% of men reported never engaging in this quasi-religious activity.


Women are also more active in yoga, meditation and making totems.


According to Figure 71, there is a significant difference in the prevalence of yoga, meditation, and totem-making practices between female and male participants. For instance, 18% of female participants reported practicing yoga "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently," compared to only 8% of male participants. Additionally, 27% of female participants engaged in some form of meditation, compared to 14% of male participants. Similarly, 29% of female participants reported making totems "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently," compared to 24% of male participants.

Figure 72. Frequency of Quasi-Religious Practices by Age Group










Fortune-telling, yoga, meditation, totem, spell-breaking, dream interpretation, and consumption of consecrated food are more common among young people.


According to Figure 72, the frequency of quasi-religious practices such as meditation, yoga, and totem making is more prevalent among younger age groups in Türkiye. In particular, it is observed that 33% of individuals in the 18-24 age group engage in meditation, compared to 14% in the 35-44 age group and 7% in the 65 and over age group. Similarly, the rate of fortune telling is higher in the 18-24 age group, at 44%, but decreases to 22% in the 35-44 age group and 16% in the 65 and over age group. These trends are also evident in spell-breaking, dream interpretation, and consumption of consecrated food. As age increases, there is also an increase in the percentage of individuals who never engage in these activities.


Visiting shrines and distributing Ashura are frequent among the elderly.


As depicted in Figure 72, older age groups demonstrate higher levels of participation in traditional and common religious activities such as distributing Ashura and visiting shrines compared to younger age groups. A considerably large proportion (89%) of participants aged 65 and over reported distributing Ashura "rarely", "sometimes", or "frequently", while this rate decreased to 79% among those aged 35-44 and 67% among those aged 18-24. In contrast, the percentage of participants who never distribute Ashura was 11% among those aged 65 and over, 21% among those aged 35-44, and 33% among those aged 18-24. Similarly, the percentage of participants who reported visiting shrines "rarely", "sometimes", or "frequently" decreased from 73% among those aged 65 and over to 63% among those aged 18-24. Concurrently, the percentage of participants who never visit shrines increased from 27% among those aged 65 and over to 37% among those aged 18-24.


Figure 73. Frequency of Quasi-Religious Practices by Education















Traditional religious activities are concentrated at lower education levels, and modern religious activities are at higher education levels.


Figure 73 illustrates the relationship between the frequency of engaging in quasi-religious practices and educational attainment. The results show that as education levels increase, the frequency of participating in practices such as yoga, meditation, and totem making, which are often considered modern, also increases. This trend is particularly pronounced among university students. For instance, while illiterate participants did not engage in yoga at all (0%), 10% of high school graduates, 22% of university students, and 24% of individuals with master's or doctoral degrees reported practicing yoga "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently." Similarly, the percentage of illiterate participants who reported "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently" meditating was 5%, while it increased to 15% among high school graduates, 31% among those with master's or doctoral degrees, and 36% among university students. The rate of totem making was 9% among illiterates, but approximately half of the university students (43%) indicated that they "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently" made totems. This rate decreased to 31% among university graduates and to 19% among those with master's or doctoral degrees.

According to Figure 73, the frequency of traditional religious practices, including distributing Ashura, visiting shrines, praying istikhara, and carrying amulets or jawshan, appears to be inversely related to educational

attainment. While almost all illiterate participants (90%) reported engaging in these activities "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently," the rate decreased to 84% among high school graduates and further to 64% among those with a master's or doctoral degree.

Figure 74. Frequency of Quasi-Religious Practices by Residential Areas







Traditional religious activities are prevalent in rural areas, while modern religious activities are prevalent in urban areas.


Figure 74 demonstrates that there is a disparity in the frequency of quasi-religious practices between urban and rural areas. Urban areas tend to exhibit higher rates of modern practices, such as yoga and meditation, while rural areas tend to have higher rates of traditional practices, such as distributing Ashura and visiting


shrines. For instance, in Türkiye, 23% of the urban population engages in yoga "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently," while only 8% of the rural population practices yoga at these frequencies. Conversely, 87% of the rural population in Türkiye distributes Ashura "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently," while this rate decreases to 75% among the urban population.


Figure 75. Frequency of Quasi-Religious Practices by Geographical Areas























Fortune telling and lead pouring are widespread religious practices in the West Marmara and Aegean regions, while dream interpretation is prevalent in the Eastern Black Sea and Northeast Anatolia regions.

Figure 75 presents the frequency of quasi-religious practices, as determined through a survey, in various NUTS-1 regions in Türkiye. The distribution of Ashura, a common religious practice in the country (as illustrated in Figure 70), appears to be most prevalent in Northeast Anatolia (84%), Eastern Marmara (83%), Southeast Anatolia (81%), and the Eastern Black Sea Region (80%). On the other hand, the regions with the highest frequency of visits to shrines are Southeastern Anatolia (85%), Eastern Marmara (83%), and Northeastern Anatolia (82%).

Upon analyzing Figure 75, it is observed that the Eastern Black Sea and Northeastern Anatolia regions stand out in the practice of dream interpretation. In these regions, 71% and 69% of the surveyed participants, respectively, reported interpreting their dreams "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently." In contrast, the frequency of fortune-telling and lead-pouring in these regions is relatively low, with rates of 19% and 6% in the Eastern Black Sea region, and 14% and 4% in Northeastern Anatolia. This suggests that the frequency of dream interpretation is higher in these regions, while the frequency of fortune-telling and lead pouring is lower compared to other regions.

The West Marmara and Aegean regions are also notable in terms of the practice of fortune-telling or having one's fortune read, as indicated by 42% and 41% of surveyed participants in these regions, respectively, reporting "rarely," "sometimes," or "frequently" engaging in these practices. However, the practice of having lead poured is most common in these two regions, with a frequency of 26%. Overall, the data presented in Figure 75 provides insight into the various quasi-religious practices and their prevalence in different regions of Türkiye.


Spell breaking is most common in the Southeastern Anatolia Region.

The Southeastern Anatolia Region has the highest prevalence of individuals who reported visiting a hodja for the purpose of breaking a spell, with 19% stating that they do so rarely, sometimes, or frequently. Conversely, the Aegean Region has the lowest rate at 4%. The geographical distribution of those who utilize evil eye beads, have their fortune told, undergo the practice of having lead poured, and visit a hodja for healing are depicted in Maps 14 through 17, respectively, according to the findings of TFRS.

Map 14. Distribution of Respondents Carrying Evil Eye Beads in Türkiye by Geographical Regions



Map 15. Distribution of Respondents who had Fortune telling in Türkiye by Geographical Regions



Map 16. Geographical Distribution of People who have lead pouring in Türkiye by Geographical Regions




Map 17. Geographical Distribution of those who go to a Hodja for Healing in Türkiye by Geographical Regions



Dimensions of Faith

Within the scope of TFRS, data was collected on the prevalence of various belief systems among individuals in Türkiye. For example, participants were asked to indicate their level of belief in "angels," "evil eye," "jinn," "miracles," "prophecies," "good luck or bad luck," "karma," and "zodiac signs" on a scale ranging from "definitely not believe" to "definitely believe." The results of this survey are presented in Figure 76, which displays the distribution of faith dimensions among the sample population in Türkiye.

Figure 76. Dimensions of faith in Türkiye




Almost everyone believes in angels and the evil eye.

Figure 76 illustrates the distribution of participants' level of belief in concepts related to the dimensions of faith in Türkiye. The results of the study indicate that the concept that participants in Türkiye believe in most intensely is angels, with 89% stating that they believe or definitely believe in angels. A small percentage (6%) stated that they did not believe or definitely did not believe in angels, while the remaining 5% were neutral. The next highest level of belief was observed in the concept of the "evil eye," with 80% of respondents stating that they believe or definitely believe in it. A smaller percentage (10%) stated that they do not believe or definitely do not believe in the evil eye, while the remaining 10% were neutral. The belief in jinn and miracles was similarly held by 68% of participants, while the percentage of those who do not believe in jinn and miracles was 20% and 17%, respectively.

Fewer people believe in horoscopes compared to other categories.

The data presented in Figure 76 reveals that a low percentage of participants in the study expressed belief in horoscopes, with only 27% stating that they believe or definitely believe in them. In contrast, a significantly higher percentage (48%) indicated that they do not believe or definitely do not believe in horoscopes. Similarly, belief in karma was also reported as low, with 28% of participants expressing belief or strong belief in it, while the majority (51%) stated that they do not believe or definitely do not believe in it. However, a majority of the participants (52% and 51%, respectively) reported belief in miracles, good luck, and bad luck. The distribution of participants' level of faith in concepts related to dimensions of faith was also analyzed based on demographic factors such as gender, age, education levels, residential area, and geographical region, as shown in Figures 77 through 81.


Figure 77. Dimensions of Faith by Gender




Women have higher belief levels than men in all categories.

According to Figure 77, there is a significant difference in the levels of faith among genders in Türkiye. The results indicate that women have higher levels of faith than men in all categories. For instance, 92% of female participants reported a belief or strong belief in angels, while 87% of male participants reported the same. The categories with the greatest discrepancy between female and male belief or strong belief were horoscopes (20%), karma (13%), and evil eye (12%), respectively. However, both genders had a similar belief or strong belief in jinn, with 68% of each reporting such belief.

Figure 78. Dimensions of Belief by Age Group






Older people are more prone to religious beliefs; younger people are more prone to secular beliefs.




Figure 78 illustrates the level of belief in various concepts related to faith dimensions in Türkiye among different age groups. A detailed analysis of this figure reveals that there are varying trends among the faith categories studied in relation to age. Some faith categories show higher belief levels among older age groups, while others exhibit higher levels of belief among younger age groups. For instance, the belief in concepts such as karma, horoscopes, good luck, and bad luck is more prominent among younger age groups compared to older age groups. For example, the percentage of those believing in karma is 37% in the youngest age group but decreases to 25% in the 35-44 age group and 18% in the oldest age group. Similarly, the belief in horoscopes is 35% among those in the 18-24 age group but decreases to 25% in the 35-44 age group and 15% in the 65 and over age group.

Contrarily, Figure 78 shows a reverse trend in the belief levels of the evil eye, miracles, and angels. The percentage of those believing or definitely believing in these concepts increases consistently from younger to older age groups. For instance, the belief in miracles is 68% among those in the 18-24 age group but increases to 79% among those aged 65 and over. Similarly, the belief in prophecies also tends to increase with age. In contrast to these categories, there is no significant difference between age groups in terms of the belief in jinn. Across all age groups, the percentage of those believing or definitely believing in jinn ranges from 68% (18-24 years old and 65 years old and above) to 72% (university students).


As demonstrated in Figure 78, the tendency to believe in the evil eye, angels, and prophecies, which are closely associated with institutional religion, is more prevalent among older age groups. Conversely, belief in concepts such as karma, horoscopes, good luck, and jinn phenomena, which are not directly related to institutional religion, is higher among younger age groups.

Figure 79. Dimensions of Faith by Education





■ Definitely do not believe
 ■ Do not believe
 ■ Neutral
 ■ Believe
 ■ Definitely believe




As the level of education increases, the belief in horoscopes increases in general.

The relationship between education level and faith dimensions is illustrated in Figure 79. University students exhibit the highest rates of belief or definite belief in concepts such as good luck, jinn, karma, and horoscopes. For instance, 59% of university students indicated that they believe or definitely believe in good luck or bad luck. The percentage of university students who indicated that they believe in karma is 40%, and the percentage of those who indicated that they believe or definitely believe in horoscopes is 36%. University graduates and those with master's or doctoral degrees also show higher rates of belief in good luck, jinn, karma, and horoscopes compared to other education levels, though not as high as among university students.

On the other hand, as shown in Figure 79, faith in angels, evil eye, miracles, and prophecies, which are considered more traditional faith categories, increases significantly at lower levels of education. For instance, the rate of belief in prophecies is recorded as 73% among illiterates, but it decreases to 55% among master's or doctoral graduates.

Figure 80. Dimensions of Faith by Residential Areas





Urban residents believe in horoscopes more.


The relationship between the residential area and faith dimensions is presented in Figure 80. The research findings indicate that belief in good luck or bad luck, karma, and horoscopes is more prevalent among participants living in urban areas. Around half (51%) of urban participants reported belief or definite belief in good luck or bad luck, compared to 49% of rural participants. Similarly, 29% of urban participants reported belief or definite belief in karma, compared to 21% of rural participants. The prevalence of belief in horoscopes among urban participants was 28%, compared to 17% among rural participants.


In contrast, rural areas had higher rates of belief in the evil eye, miracles, and angels. For example, 84% of rural participants reported belief or definite belief in the evil eye, compared to 80% of urban participants. The difference in belief in miracles and angels between rural and urban populations was 8% and 6%, respectively.

Figure 81. Dimensions of Faith by Geographical Regions









Northeast Anatolia and Central Anatolia believe in jinns the most.

The data shown in Figure 81 illustrates the participants' levels of belief in concepts related to the faith dimensions in various NUTS-1 regions in Türkiye. The Northeast Anatolia region exhibited the highest rate of belief in jinns, with 85% of participants stating that they believe or definitely believe in jinns. Central Anatolia had the second highest rate at 84%, while the Aegean region had the lowest rate at 60%.

Western Marmara and Aegean regions commonly believe in horoscopes, karma, and good or bad luck.

The Western Marmara region exhibits a high prevalence of belief in concepts such as good luck, bad luck, karma, and horoscopes, as demonstrated in Figure 81. Specifically, 60% of respondents in this region indicated their belief or definite belief in good luck or bad luck. Additionally, 46% of participants in the Western Marmara region reported belief in karma, a percentage that decreases to 15% in the Southeastern Anatolia region. The rates of those stating belief or definite belief in horoscopes were found to be 34% in Western Anatolia, 30% in Western Marmara, and 15% in Southeastern Anatolia. These results, as presented in Map 18 by TFRS, reveal the geographic distribution of those who believe in horoscopes in Türkiye.


Map 18. Geographical Distribution of Respondents Believing in Horoscopes in Türkiye



Happiness


Half of the population is happy.

As part of the TFRS study, participants were surveyed on their socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics, as well as their overall level of happiness, in order to assess their satisfaction with life. To gauge their happiness, participants were asked to select the most appropriate response from a list of options ranging from "very unhappy" to "very happy" in response to the question of how happy they feel in general. The results of this question are presented in Figure 82, which displays the happiness rates of the study participants.



Half of Türkiye describes themselves as happy.


According to the data presented in Figure 82, approximately half (49%) of the participants in Türkiye reported feeling happy or very happy. In contrast, 17% of the participants stated that they were unhappy or very unhappy. The remaining 34% of the participants reported being neutral in terms of happiness. Figures 83, 84, and 85 provide further insight by breaking down the happiness rates of the participants by gender, age groups, and education levels, respectively. Additionally, Figure 86 and Figure 87 examine the happiness rates of the participants based on their residential areas and geographical regions.



Women are slightly happier.

Figure 83 illustrates the relationship between gender and happiness, revealing that 50% of the female participants self-identified as happy or very happy, whereas 48% of the male participants reported the same level of happiness. In contrast, 15% of the female participants stated that they were unhappy or very unhappy, while 18% of the male participants identified as unhappy or very unhappy. These findings suggest that, while both genders experience similar levels of happiness, there is a slightly higher percentage of male participants who report being unhappy or very unhappy.


Figure 84. Happiness by Age Group



The old are happier, and the young are less happy.

Data from Figure 84 suggests that older age groups in Türkiye tend to report higher levels of happiness compared to younger age groups. Individuals between the ages of 18-24 report the lowest level of happiness, with 40% stating that they are "happy" or "very happy" and 19% stating that they are "unhappy" or "very unhappy." Additionally, 41% of this age group report being neither happy nor unhappy. In contrast, those aged 35 and above tend to report higher levels of happiness, with 53% of those aged 35-44 and 60% of those aged 65 and over stating that they are "happy" or "very happy." However, it should be noted that the rate of individuals stating that they are "unhappy" or "very unhappy" rises to 19% in the 18-24 age group, while it decreases to 13% in the 65 and over age group.

Figure 85. Happiness by Education




Education has no significant effect on happiness.

Figure 85 illustrates the relationship between education level and happiness among the participants. The results demonstrate a weak correlation between higher education and happiness. Nonetheless, illiterate and university students displayed lower happiness levels compared to the other education groups. The percentage

of illiterate participants who reported being happy was 33%, while 42% of university students reported being happy. In contrast, the happiness rate ranged from 49% to 54% among the other education levels.


Figure 86. Happiness by Residential Areas



(Is) happiness in the village?

A comparison of the happiness rates of participants according to their place of residence is demonstrated in Figure 86. Results indicate that those residing in rural areas report higher levels of happiness or feelings of happiness compared to those in urban areas. While only 48% of the urban population report being happy or very happy, this rate increases to 62% among the rural population. Additionally, 17% of both rural and urban participants reported being unhappy or not happy at all. However, a higher percentage of urban participants (35%) described themselves as "neither happy nor unhappy" compared to those in rural areas (21%).

Figure 87. Happiness by Geographical Regions



Northeastern Anatolia is significantly happier.

As depicted in Figure 87, which presents the happiness rates of the participants according to the NUTS-1 regions, a higher percentage of individuals residing in the Northeast Anatolia Region reported feeling happy or very happy (65%) compared to those residing in other regions. Conversely, a lower percentage of individuals

in this region reported feeling unhappy or very unhappy (13%). The two regions with the next highest levels of happiness were East Marmara (57%) and East Black Sea (55%), respectively.

The most unhappy region is Southeast Anatolia.

The data from Figure 87 reveals that Northeast Anatolia has the highest percentage of participants who reported being happy or very happy. However, the region with the highest percentage of participants who described themselves as unhappy or very unhappy was Southeastern Anatolia, with a rate of 23%. Istanbul also had a significant portion of unhappy participants, with 19% stating they considered themselves unhappy. The TFRS findings provide a visual representation of this distribution through Map 19, which displays the regions where participants reported being happy, and Map 20, which displays the regions where participants reported being unhappy.

Map 19. Geographical Distribution of Participants' Happiness in Türkiye



Map 20. Geographical Distribution of Participants' Unhappiness in Türkiye








3 Common Typologies of Belief and Religiosity

In the TFRS Project, belief and religiosity typologies prevalent in Türkiye were analyzed using a two-step cluster method. This method was based on data collected on several indicators of religiosity, including frequency of prayer, fasting, reading the Qur'an, and performing non-compulsory (*nafile*) worship, as well as the level of religiosity. In addition, proximity to various belief and ideology forms such as Islam, conservatism, nationalism, Islamism, Atatürkism, secularism, deism, and atheism were also taken into consideration. Through this clustering analysis, which involved a total of 14 parameters, four distinct belief and religiosity typologies were identified. The distribution of these typologies within Türkiye is illustrated in Chart 5.

Chart 5. Distribution of Belief and Religiosity Typologies in Türkiye



According to Chart 5, the results of the clustering analysis show that the most prevalent typology in Türkiye is "mainstream religious," comprising 40.2% of the population. The second largest typology is "devout Muslim," accounting for 29.5% of the population. The third typology is "secular-Muslim," representing 22.2% of the population, while the fourth typology, "secular-non-believer," represents 8.1%. The details of the variables that make up these typologies are further explained in Table 2.

Table 2. Parameters of Belief and Religiosity Typologies

1	2	3	4	
Devout Muslim	Mainstream Muslim	Secular Muslim	Secular Non-believer	
29,5%	40,2%	22,2%	8,1%	
5 times daily prayer 4,58	5 times daily prayer 3,03	5 times daily prayer 1,58	5 times daily prayer 1,00	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 1
Religiosity 4,13	Religiosity 3,71	Religiosity 2,93	Religiosity 1,29	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 1
Muslim 4,88	Muslim 4,62	Muslim 3,80	Muslim 1,41	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.96
Fasting in Ramadan 4,91	Fasting in Ramadan 4,57	Fasting in Ramadan 3,43	Fasting in Ramadan 1,32	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.83
Islamist 4,51	Islamist 3,48	Islamist 1,80	Islamist 1,09	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.72
Laicist 1,65	Laicist 3,50	Laicist 4,46	Laicist 4,44	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.69
Atheist 1,00	Atheist 1,03	Atheist 1,31	Atheist 3,07	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.68
Praying 3,95	Praying 3,71	Praying 3,44	Praying 1,93	Min: 1, Max: 4 Importance: 0.63
Ataturkist 1,69	Ataturkist 3,45	Ataturkist 4,52	Ataturkist 4,17	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.62
Deist 1,01	Deist 1,05	Deist 1,88	Deist 3,33	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.60
Reading the Qur'an 3,28	Reading the Qur'an 2,42	Reading the Qur'an 1,66	Reading the Qur'an 1,10	Min: 1, Max: 4 Importance: 0.54
Voluntary Worship 3,40	Voluntary Worship 2,52	Voluntary Worship 1,59	Voluntary Worship 1,13	Min: 1, Max: 4 Importance: 0.50
Conservative 3,75	Conservative 2,88	Conservative 1,61	Conservative 1,08	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.43
Nationalist 3,04	Nationalist 3,67	Nationalist 3,59	Nationalist 2,24	Min: 1, Max: 5 Importance: 0.08

There are four typologies of belief and religiosity in Türkiye.

The 14 parameters used to examine belief and religiosity typologies in Türkiye are detailed in Table 2. Table 2 also demonstrates the degree of influence and importance of these parameters in the clustering method. The most notable religious group identified in this study is the devout Muslims, who exhibit strong religious practices and a strong identification with identity categories such as Muslim, conservative, and religious. These individuals consistently engage in activities such as fasting, prayer, and Qur'an reading, as well as performing

voluntary acts of worship. Additionally, they view themselves as distinct from belief categories such as atheism and deism and exhibit low levels of identification with Ataturkism and secularism.

According to Table 2, the largest group in Türkiye is composed of mainstream religious individuals, who engage in regular religious practices such as fasting, regular prayer, and frequent worship, as well as occasional Qur'anic reading and voluntary prayer. These individuals can be regular practitioners of their faith and hold close to their Muslim and religious identities. However, they also tend to identify more closely with secular ideologies such as Ataturkism and secularism compared to devout Muslim individuals. Additionally, this group is distinguished by a strong nationalist identity compared to other groups.

According to Table 2, the secular-Muslim group in Türkiye comprises approximately 22% of the adult population. This group can be characterized as individuals who embrace their Muslim identity to a considerable extent, yet also exhibit a significant distance from Islamist and conservative identities. They engage in frequent fasting, occasional Qur'an reading, and occasional prayer. A defining feature of this group is their strong adherence to Ataturkism and secularism, as well as widespread acceptance of nationalism.

According to Table 2 and Chart 5, 8.1% of Türkiye's population can be classified as secular non-believers. This group is characterized by a significant distance from both Muslim and religious identities, with many individuals identifying as atheists or deists, which do not involve belief in God. Another notable aspect of this typology is the prevalence of secular and Ataturkist identities, as well as a lack of participation in religious practices beyond saying prayers. Additionally, nationalism is present in this group, though it is less influential compared to the other defining parameters. It is worth mentioning that nationalism is the most prominent feature among all four typologies.

The research findings on belief and religiosity typologies are further demonstrated in Tables 3, 4, and 5, which provide a breakdown of these typologies by gender, age, and education level. Additionally, Tables 6 and 7 present the distribution of these typologies among various residential areas and geographical regions, respectively.

Table 3. Typologies of Belief and Religiosity by Gender

	Devout Muslim	Mainstream Muslim	Secular Muslim	Secular Non-believer	Total
Male	30,3%	40,1%	20,9%	8,6%	100%
Female	28,6%	40,3%	23,7%	7,4%	100%

There is no significant difference in the distribution of belief and religiosity typologies regarding gender.

Table 3 illustrates the gender distribution of belief and religiosity typologies. It can be observed that there is no significant variance between men and women in regard to the prevalence of these typologies. Essentially, the ratio distribution of these typologies among men and women mirrors the overall distribution in Türkiye, as depicted in Chart 5. The only exception to this pattern is the secular-Muslim typology, in which the rate of women is 2.8% higher than that of men.

Table 4. Typologies of Belief and Religiosity by Age Group

	Devout Muslim	Mainstream Muslim	Secular Muslim	Secular Non-believer	Total
Age 65 or older	46,3%	31,6%	18,9%	3,2%	100%
Age 45-64	36,8%	40,9%	16,4%	5,9%	100%
Age 35-44	32,4%	40,6%	18,7%	8,2%	100%
Age 25-34	24,0%	42,2%	25,6%	8,1%	100%
Age 18-24	18,4%	39,9%	29,1%	12,6%	100%

There are differences between age groups regarding the distribution of belief and religiosity typologies.

The data presented in Table 4 demonstrates the relationship between age and the distribution of belief and religiosity typologies. It is evident that age plays a significant role in the prevalence of devout Muslim individuals, with a rate of 18.4% among those aged 18-24, increasing to 32.4% in the 30-44 age group and 46.3% in the 65 and over age group. In contrast, the secular-unbelieving group is more commonly found among younger individuals, with a rate of 12.6% among those aged 18-24. There is little variation in the prevalence of mainstream religious individuals among those under 65, with a rate hovering around 40%. However, this rate does decrease to 31.6% among those aged 65 and over. Additionally, a non-linear pattern is observed in the secular-Muslim typology, which is more prevalent among young and older age groups.

Table 5. Typologies of Belief and Religiosity by Education

	Devout Muslim	Mainstream Muslim	Secular Muslim	Secular Non-believer	Total
Illiterate - No formal schooling	60,0%	32,0%	8,0%	0,0%	100%
Literate - No formal schooling	66,7%	33,3%	0,0%	0,0%	100%
Primary school	51,3%	39,3%	6,7%	2,7%	100%
Middle school	39,3%	46,7%	12,1%	1,9%	100%
High school	30,3%	45,9%	18,6%	5,2%	100%
Associate Degree	22,2%	40,7%	30,9%	6,2%	100%
BA Student	16,0%	37,1%	33,7%	13,1%	100%
BA Degree	21,9%	36,7%	29,7%	11,7%	100%
Masters of PhD Degree	18,0%	38,0%	22,0%	22,0%	100%

Secular Muslim typology is most prevalent among university graduates.

The distribution of belief and religiosity typologies according to education levels is presented in Table 5. It can be observed that there are significant differences in the distribution of these groups based on the level of education. The devout Muslim typology is more prevalent among individuals with lower levels of education, such as primary school graduates or lower. On the other hand, the secular-Muslim typology and the secular-non-believer typology are more common among individuals with higher levels of education. For instance, the prevalence of the devout Muslim typology decreases significantly among individuals with high school

graduates or higher education levels. In contrast, the secular-Muslim typology exhibits a maximum representation of 12.1% among primary school graduates or lower, but this rate increases to 30.9% among college graduates and 33.7% among university students. However, this rate decreases slightly among those with higher education, with a representation of 29.7% among university graduates and 22.0% among master's or doctoral graduates.

The secular non-believer typology is most prevalent among master's or doctoral graduates.

The secular-non-believer typology is more prevalent among individuals with higher levels of education, particularly university students, with a representation rate of 13.1%. This typology becomes even more pronounced among those with master's or doctoral degrees, reaching a representation rate of 22.0%. In contrast, this typology is not observed among those with low literacy levels or those who have not completed primary education. In comparison, the mainstream religious typology is less impacted by educational level, with a representation rate of 32.0% among illiterates and 38.0% among individuals with advanced degrees. However, this typology is most represented among secondary school graduates (46.7%) and high school graduates (45.9%). These findings are demonstrated in Table 5.

Table 6. Typologies of Belief and Religiosity by Residential Area

	Devout Muslim	Mainstream Muslim	Secular Muslim	Secular Non-believer	Total
Urban	27,9%	40,6%	23,0%	8,5%	100%
Rural	46,9%	36,5%	13,5%	3,1%	100%

In rural areas, moderate Islamist groups are more prevalent, while mainstream religious groups are more prevalent in urban areas.

As can be seen in Table 6, the distribution of belief and religiosity typologies in residential areas reveals that the devout Muslim typology is the most prevalent in rural areas, comprising 46.9% of the population in these regions. In contrast, the mainstream religiosity typology, which is the most widespread across Türkiye as demonstrated in Chart 5, is represented by 36.5% of individuals in rural areas. The secular-Muslim typology is present in 13.5% of individuals in rural areas, while the secular non-believer group accounts for a representation rate of only 3.1% in these regions.

Table 6 reveals that mainstream religiosity is the most prevalent typology in urban areas, comprising 40.6% of the population. In contrast, the devout Muslim typology, which is prevalent in almost half of rural areas, is less common in urban areas, with a representation rate of 27.9%. On the other hand, both secular-Muslim and secular-non-believer typologies are more common in urban areas, with representation rates of 23.0% and 8.5%, respectively.

Table 7. Typologies of Belief and Religiosity by Geographical Region

	Devout Muslim	Mainstream Muslim	Secular Muslim	Secular Non-believer	Total
South East Anatolia	42,6%	42,6%	9,0%	5,7%	100%
Central East Anatolia	61,8%	25,5%	3,6%	9,1%	100%
Northeast Anatolia	52,2%	39,1%	8,7%	0,0%	100%
East Black Sea	45,9%	35,1%	16,2%	2,7%	100%
West Black Sea	29,1%	45,3%	20,9%	4,7%	100%
Central Anatolia	27,1%	55,7%	12,9%	4,3%	100%
Mediterranean	17,9%	45,3%	27,4%	9,4%	100%
West Anatolia	35,1%	39,2%	18,9%	6,8%	100%
East Marmara	19,3%	44,3%	31,8%	4,5%	100%
Aegea	7,3%	31,3%	44,8%	16,7%	100%
West Marmara	15,1%	32,1%	41,5%	11,3%	100%
Istanbul	27,0%	38,8%	22,4%	11,7%	100%

The devout Muslim group is found at higher rates in the Eastern and Northeastern regions.

Table 7 displays the distribution of belief and religiosity typologies in various geographical regions. The results of the clustering study reveal notable disparities in the ratio distribution of the four different religiosity typologies among the 12 regions. The areas with the highest prevalence of the devout Muslim typology are Central Eastern Anatolia (61.8%) and Northeastern Anatolia (52.2%). In contrast, the Aegean region has the lowest representation of conservative believers at 7.3%. There is a significant difference of nine times between the Middle Eastern Anatolia region, where devout Muslim typology is most prevalent, and the Aegean region, where it is least prevalent. On the other hand, the distribution of the secular-Muslim typology across regions exhibits an opposing trend. The secular-Muslim typology is most common in the Aegean region at 44.8% and in West Marmara at 41.5%, but it decreases to 8.7% in Northeast Anatolia and 3.6% in Central Eastern Anatolia.


Secular non-believers are more common in the Aegean Region.

As indicated in Table 7, the Aegean Region exhibits the highest prevalence of secular-unbelieving individuals, at 16.7%. Istanbul also demonstrates a notable proportion of this typology, at 11.7%. In contrast, the secular non-believer group is not present in Northeast Anatolia, as indicated by a rate of 0.0%.

The mainstream religious typology is most common in the Central Anatolia Region.

According to the data presented in Table 7 and Chart 5, the region with the highest percentage of individuals exhibiting mainstream religiosity is Central Anatolia, at 55.7%. The Mediterranean, Western Black Sea, and Eastern Marmara regions also demonstrate significant proportions of mainstream religiosity, at 45.3%, 45.3%, and 44.3%, respectively. In contrast, the region with the lowest representation of mainstream religiosity is Central Anatolia, at 25.5%. Maps 21 through 24, provided by TFRS, illustrate the geographical distribution of mainstream religiosity, devout Muslim beliefs, secular-Muslim beliefs, and secular-non-believer beliefs within Türkiye.

Map 21. Distribution of the Typology of Mainstream Religious by Geographical Regions in Türkiye




Map 22. Distribution of the Typology of Devout Muslims in Türkiye by Geographical Regions.



Map 23. Distribution of Secular Muslim Typology by Geographical Regions in Türkiye



Map 24. Distribution of Secular Non-Believer Typology in Türkiye by Geographical Regions







4 Conclusion

The present research has demonstrated that religious beliefs and practices are widespread in Türkiye. Furthermore, the study has shown that there are significant variations in the prevalence of religious beliefs, attitudes, and practices among different social groups and regions. These differences are particularly pronounced in relation to gender, age groups, education level, residential areas, and geographical regions. It should be noted, however, that the report only covers a specific aspect of religious beliefs and religiosity as measured by the TFRS survey. The appendices include graphs that display the prevalence levels of a range of additional religious beliefs, attitudes, and practices, regardless of differences among social groups.

Most of the society (94%) are believers, while non-believers account for around 6%.

According to the survey results presented in this report, belief in God is widespread in Türkiye, with almost all of society (94%) expressing belief in God, while only 6% report not believing in God.

Is deism widespread in Türkiye?

Before examining the prevalence of deism in Türkiye, it is crucial to consider two key points. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that the current discourse on the prevalence of deism in Türkiye is largely based on subjective observations and labels, rather than empirical data gathered through rigorous research. Those who argue for or against the widespread nature of deism in Türkiye often do so without presenting evidence from comprehensive, academically sound research.

It should also be noted that deism is a more intellectually-oriented movement rather than a widely held belief or disbelief system. When examining the discourse surrounding deism in contemporary debates, it becomes clear that the term is not used in accordance with its traditional definition, but rather refers to a trend similar to the concept of "believing without belonging" proposed by sociologists such as Grace Davie to describe the shifting attitudes and practices of religion in Europe. Through her research in Britain, Davie found that belief in God persists among younger generations, albeit with a growing detachment from institutionalized religious structures and practices. This trend was documented in her 1994 publication, *Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing without Belonging*.

A review of the deism debates in Türkiye reveals that the trend referred to as deism aligns with Davie's concept of belief without belonging. These debates have highlighted that a significant portion of society, particularly younger individuals, believes in God but distances themselves from religious institutions and practices. Thus, the current discourse on deism in Türkiye pertains more to a sociological shift rather than a philosophical or

theological one. This interpretation of deism might have led individuals who perceive themselves as socially detached from religion to identify as deists.

According to the findings of the TFRS study, 8% of participants in Türkiye self-identify as being close to deism. However, it should be noted that this percentage does not solely represent individuals who identify as deists. The study found that individuals who identified as atheists or agnostics, as well as those who are believers but consider themselves sociologically distant from religion, may also express a connection to deism. Additionally, the overall prevalence of the "secular non-believer" group, which includes those who are the most distant from religious beliefs and practices and feel close to atheist or deist identities, is only 8% in Türkiye. Furthermore, analysis of the data on belief in God revealed that 5.7% of the total population does not believe in God, with 1.5% identifying as atheists and 2.5% as agnostics. It can be inferred that the remaining 1.7% fall into the category of those who feel close to deism. Therefore, the prevalence of deism in Türkiye is estimated to be less than 2%.

The educational group with the lowest level of belief in God is postgraduates.

The findings of this study indicate a strong negative correlation between education level and religiosity. Individuals with advanced degrees, such as masters or doctorals, exhibit the lowest levels of belief in a higher power, with approximately 18% identifying as non-believers. Additionally, university students also demonstrate lower levels of belief compared to other education levels, with a non-belief rate of 13%. These results demonstrate the influence of education on religious beliefs and practices.

Women are both more religious and less in favor of traditionalism.

According to the findings of the TFRS study, women appear to exhibit higher levels of religiousness in terms of both belief and practice compared to men. Additionally, the research suggests that women tend to hold less traditional views, particularly with regard to gender roles, and tend to feel a greater affinity for modern secular ideologies than men. Overall, these results indicate that there are significant differences in the religious attitudes and beliefs of men and women.

Approximately half of all women regularly wear a headscarf.

According to TFRS findings, 48% of female participants in Türkiye report consistently wearing headscarves in public, while 47% state that they rarely or never do so. Additionally, 6% of female participants indicate that they occasionally wear headscarves. These findings reveal that a slightly larger proportion of women in Türkiye wear headscarves in public compared to those who do not. The study also found that approximately 27% of women habitually wear headscarves within the confines of their homes.

The rate of those who regularly pray five times a day is approximately 40%.

According to the research findings, 39% of adults in Türkiye pray five times a day frequently or always, which is considered regular prayer. This rate increases to 68% in the 65 and over age group and decreases to 20% in the 18-24 age group. The region with the highest rate of regular prayer is Central Eastern Anatolia, at 63%, while the West Marmara Region has the lowest rate at 23%.

Fasting is a very common religious practice.

The practice of fasting during the month of Ramadan is a common religious practice within Türkiye, with 75% of the society surveyed stating that they regularly engage in this practice. However, the frequency of fasting varies significantly among different regions within the country. In the central, eastern, and northeastern regions, the rate of regular fasting exceeds 90%, while in the Aegean region, it drops to 53%. This study aims to examine the prevalence and variations of fasting within Türkiye.

There is a broad consensus that women wearing headscarves can work in the public sector.

It is evident that there is a general agreement among the Turkish population on the subject of women wearing headscarves holding public office. A significant majority of participants (85%) support the idea of women wearing headscarves serving as judges or prosecutors. However, it is noteworthy that among those who hold advanced degrees (master's or doctoral), there is a slightly lower level of support, with 80% in favor and 11% opposed. In contrast, university students demonstrate the highest level of support, with 92% agreeing that women wearing headscarves should be able to serve as judges or prosecutors and only 2% disagreeing.

A review of the NUTS-1 regions in Türkiye suggests a general agreement among participants that women wearing headscarves can serve as judges or prosecutors. However, the Aegean Region deviates significantly from the other 11 regions in this regard. Across 11 regions in Türkiye, the percentage of participants who support the idea that women wearing headscarves can serve as judges or prosecutors ranges from 82% to 94%. In contrast, only 77% of participants in the Aegean Region express support for this idea.

The majority think that religion can be practised freely in a secular country.

The results of this study reveal that a majority of the participants in Türkiye (73%) believe that the practice of religion can coexist within a secular state. This sentiment was held by 70% of male participants and 75% of female participants. Additionally, the regional analysis shows that the agreement rate for this belief was lowest in the Northeast Anatolia Region (59%) and highest in the West Marmara Region (84%).

The most widely accepted identities are nationalism, Islamism, Atatürkism, religiosity, secularism and Sunnism.

According to the research, the most prevalent identity in Türkiye is the Muslim identity. Other significant identities include nationalist, Islamist, Atatürkist, religious, secularist, and Sunni identities. The data suggests that approximately half of the Turkish population identifies with one of these identities. These findings indicate that both traditional religious identities and modern secular identities are recognized and embraced by a significant portion of society in Türkiye.

70% of society believes that women and men are different by nature.

In Türkiye, there is a significant level of agreement (70%) among individuals that men and women possess inherent differences in their nature. This sentiment is even more prevalent in the Eastern Black Sea Region, where the percentage of participants expressing agreement with this idea reaches 80%.

The majority disagrees with the idea that the man is the head of the household.

There is a lower percentage of individuals who concur with the notion that the head of the household should be male (40%) compared to those who disagree with this idea (47%). Among university students, the proportion of those who disagree with this statement is particularly high, reaching 67%.

One-fifth of the population agrees that a man and a woman can live together without marriage.

In Türkiye, a significant proportion of the population (68%) does not agree with the idea that cohabitation between a man and a woman without being married is acceptable. However, a minority (21%) of the society holds a more liberal stance on this matter. It is worth noting that support for cohabitation is highest among university students, with 40% of this group expressing agreement with the statement.

Is religiosity strong in Türkiye?

The present study, which employed a cross-sectional design, does not provide a reliable basis for comparing contemporary levels of religiosity with those of the past. However, we can examine the current situation in Türkiye in two ways: first, by examining the prevalence of religious beliefs and practices based on the analyzed parameters; second, by assessing the general perception of the prevalence of belief and religiosity parameters in Türkiye and determining whether the current data indicate higher or lower levels than these perceptions.

Upon analysis of the first option, it becomes evident that religious beliefs and practices are present in various forms and at varying levels within a significant portion of society, as demonstrated in the provided report. The typology study presented in the report indicates that only 8% of society is completely devoid of faith and religiosity, while approximately 70% of society exhibits religiosity at either a level of piety or mainstream adherence. Additionally, 22% of society, categorized as secular Muslims, possess religious beliefs but have lower levels of religious practice. Overall, it can be concluded that approximately 92% of the population exhibits some form of religious beliefs, attitudes, and practices.

In order to assess the level of religiosity in Türkiye, TFRS conducted a perception survey via an online platform. Participants were asked to estimate the prevalence of various religious beliefs and practices in the country. The present report presents the data collected from the field study and the estimates obtained from the perception survey. It was found that the actual levels of belief and religiosity in the field study were higher than the perceived levels among the survey participants. Therefore, it can be concluded that the prevalence of religious beliefs and practices in Türkiye is generally higher than what is perceived by the population.

One potential explanation for the discrepancy between the perceived or estimated levels of religiosity in Türkiye and those observed in empirical research could be that participants base their estimates on their perceptions formed through media exposure or experiences in urban settings.

Is Türkiye becoming more secular?

It is not possible to accurately determine whether religiosity in Türkiye has increased or decreased based solely on the findings of the TFRS survey. As the TFRS survey was conducted for the first time in 2022 as a cross-sectional study, it would be inappropriate to make reliable comparisons with previous years as no comparable data has been collected. However, when examining the distribution of certain beliefs and religious practices

among different age groups, significant differences can be observed between younger and older individuals. For example, younger individuals tend to engage in religious practices such as praying and fasting at lower rates, and also tend to distance themselves from identity categories such as Muslimness, Islamism, conservatism, and Sunnism.

The results of this research reveal that a significant percentage of young people in Türkiye adhere to secular ideologies and exhibit lower levels of religiosity compared to their older counterparts. At first glance, this may lead to the assumption that religion will become less prevalent, and secularization will accelerate in Türkiye over time. However, it is crucial to consider the potential impact of generational differences on these findings. It is possible that the differences between young and older age groups do not signify larger sociological transformations, but rather exhibit unique characteristics of each generation. For example, consider the differences in cycling rates between different age groups. While older individuals may use bicycles less often, this does not necessarily mean that cycling was less prevalent in the past. Rather, cycling is often linked to specific life stages, and it is common for young people to participate in this activity. It may be that the older generation used to cycle more frequently when they were younger but do so less frequently now. The opposite of this trend might be observed in the realm of religiosity. Perhaps, the elderly who are more religious today were less religious when they were young. If this is the case, the young who are less religious today may become more religious as they age. Therefore, to accurately determine trends in secularization in Türkiye, it will be necessary to conduct additional research over time. Simply comparing the religious beliefs and practices of young people to those of older individuals in a single study is insufficient to make definite conclusions about the trajectory of secularization in the country.





5 References

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





6 Appendices

Appendix 1: Additional Figures


Additional Figure 1. Religious practice/ worship – I




Additional Figure 2. Religious practice/ worship – II



Additional Figure 3. Religious practice/ worship – III




Additional Figure 4. Religious practice/ worship – IV




Additional Figure 5. Alevi religious practice – I




Additional Figure 6. Alevi religious practice – II




Additional Figure 7. Religion and daily life




Additional Figure 8. Marriage with Non-Muslim




Additional Figure 9. Religious sensitivity – I




Additional Figure 10. Religious sensitivity – II




Additional Figure 11. Faith in Destiny




Additional Figure 12. Perception of the Qur'an




Additional Figure 13. Perception on faith




Additional Figure 14. Doubts on faith




Additional Figure 15. Religion and science



Additional Figure 16. Perception of religiosity



Additional Figure 17. Attitudes of personal religiosity




Additional Figure 18. Headscarf




Additional Figure 19. Attitudes towards the headscarf




Additional Figure 20. Public Sphere and Religion




Additional Figure 21. Family and friends




Additional Figure 22. Religiosity of parents – I




Additional Figure 23. Religiosity of parents – II




Additional Figure 24. Religiosity of parents – III



Additional Figure 25. Sources of religious knowledge




Additional Figure 26. Social media use




Appendix 2: Sample Demographics


Additional Figure 26. Gender distribution




Additional Figure 27. Age distribution



Additional Figure 28. Distribution of education level



Additional Figure 29. Income level distribution



Additional Figure 30. Rural-urban distribution

